

“When hostile aircraft unexpectedly bombed the airfield on the morning of June 22, the fire engulfed aircraft, trains, and hangars. And from the fire over the airfield, combat aircraft began to rise. It was a link led by the squadron commander, Captain M. Three enemy bombers were shot down, one of them crashed into the ground not far from the village. Ostritsya... Six times took to the air on the first day of the war, a fighter pilot, senior lieutenant Sh. During the last sortie, his plane was seriously damaged. But the brave pilot did not leave his comrades - in this duel, Senior Lieutenant Sh., together with his comrades, shot down two more hostile aircraft ... On the same day, Senior Lieutenant R. On the "Seagull" he boldly attacked fascist bomber Yu-87 (???), which was preparing to strike at the railway junction ... "(240) Let us return, however, to the Opersvodka of the headquarters of the 12th Army: "... During 22.6, the aircraft of the 12th Army lost:

12 NLP - 36 on the ground, of which four can be restored, three aircraft in combat. Enemy aircraft shot down 11 aircraft.

247 IAP - disabled and destroyed 42 aircraft 166

IAP - 4 destroyed on the ground, 10 aircraft damaged.

If this Opersvodka is true, then it turns out that on June 22, 1941, the 64th IAD lost a total of 107 aircraft on the ground (with the losses of the 149th IAP mentioned above and taking into account damaged and temporarily out of order) 107 aircraft. Twice as many as the irretrievable "airfield" losses of all aviation of the Southern Front for the entire 41st year! Moreover, this rout took place on the peripheral sector of the front (if in the Chernivtsi direction the Romanian troops, with the help of several infantry regiments, at least demonstrated activity in order to divert attention and mislead the Soviet command, then Stanislav was completely in the region of the Hungarian border, where until June 26 there were no there was no fighting). It is difficult to say how reliable the above figures for Soviet losses are. In the

archive file, the combat reports of the headquarters of the 64th IAD to the front headquarters of the Air Force begin with a document signed at 22.54 on [June 24.\[277\]](#)

Most likely, this is a misprint, since we are talking about the combat work of the division not for the 24th, but for June 23, i.e., for the second day of the war. The division "covered the Stanislav node and conducted reconnaissance of the enemy." The following number of

sorties performed by regiments of the

64th IAD is indicated: 12th IAP - 58 with a flight time of 43 hours 10 minutes.

149th IAP - 77 sorties with a flying time of 71

hours. 166th IAP - 101 sorties with a flying time of 82 hours. 247th IAP - 10 sorties with a flying time of 7 hours 30 minutes. These figures do not contradict (although, strictly speaking, they cannot be considered confirmation) the above figures for the losses of the regiments of the division. 10 sorties of the 247th IAP suggest that most of the 48 "gulls" of the regiment were destroyed or damaged. The 166th IAP flew the most, apparently suffering the smallest losses on the first day of the war. By the morning of June 22, the 149th IAP had more than a hundred aircraft (including fifty "old-type fighters"), so even after the loss of either 15 or 36 combat vehicles, it could well complete 77 sorties in a long June day. Even in

the 12th IAP, after the loss of 36 aircraft, 30 "donkeys" and "gulls" should have remained (not counting the obsolete I-15s). Here, for the first time (but by no means the last on the pages of this book), we meet with the manifestation of that law of war, which Napoleon formulated with the words: "Military happiness is on the side of large battalions." A Russian proverb expresses the same idea even more briefly: "There is no reception against scrap"²⁷. The colossal exertion of all the forces and resources of a vast country, the long-term labor of tens of millions of collective farm, Gulag and factory slaves made it possible to accumulate such mountains of weapons (including thousands of aircraft at border airfields) that even an air division that lost a hundred fighters in one morning could carry out 246

sorties - about half of the average daily number of sorties of the 5th Luftwaffe Air Corps! There were many departures, the results - much less. This was mainly due to the fact that on the second day of the war, the fighters of the 64th IAD "ironed clean air" - the Germans, having done what they managed to do on the first day, switched all the forces of the

troops in the zone of the main attack GA "South". At that moment, only the 4th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe in Romania had relative "freedom of hands", whose bombers in the evening

On June 23, accompanied by two dozen Messers, they delivered another blow to Chernivtsi. The Germans claimed two Soviet fighters shot down in action; the combat report of the headquarters of the 64th IAD (the same one dated 22.54 June 24, but most likely dated June 23) records the loss of one aircraft in the 149th IAP and the absence of downed enemy aircraft - in the latter aspect, the messages from both sides

of the front coincide. In total, judging by the above-mentioned combat report of the headquarters of the 64th IAD, 4 enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles on June 23 (although this figure is doubtful, since only one (!) Aircraft is mentioned in the description of the combat operations of the regiments, shot down by fighters of the 12th IAP) and lost 2 of their own. There were no losses on the ground (in particular, during the raid on the airfield of the 149th IAP in Chernivtsi) - a clear confirmation that only a raid on a "peacefully sleeping" airfield with uncamouflaged aircraft and absent flight

personnel can be successful. The main "opponent" for the pilots of the 64th IAP on that day was their own anti-aircraft artillery, which, apparently, decided to catch up on the first day of the war. Anti-aircraft gunners shot down 2 aircraft in the 247th IAP and 3 in the 149th IAP, while one pilot was killed and two more were injured. All this is somewhat strange, considering that the "seagull" (a blunt-nosed biplane with a retractable landing gear) had such a characteristic silhouette that it was absolutely impossible to confuse it with German or Romanian

Concluding this brief and very controversial review of the military operations of the 64th IAD, we note that the main characters went on to make quite a successful military career. The commander of the 12th IAP, Major P.T. Korobkov (Hero of the Soviet Union, participant in the war in Spain, on Khalkhin Gol and in Finland) became a colonel, commanded fighter divisions (265th and 320th), after the war he rose to the rank of major general and the post of head of the Higher Academic Air Defense Courses. The commander of the 64th IAD Osadchy finished the war with the rank of major general and as commander of the 11th Guards IAD, received the title of Hero, was awarded order

Suvorov, Kutuzov, World War II, Red Star, the Czechoslovak Order of the Battle Cross. Commander of the Air Force of the 12th Army, Major General T.T. Khryukin (Hero of the Soviet Union, participant in the war in Spain and China, commander of the Air Force of the 14th Army during the Finnish War) became a colonel general, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, commanded the Air Armies (8th and 1st), was awarded a great many orders; after the war - Deputy Commander of the USSR Air Force for military educational institutions.

To the west of the 12th Army, in the zone of Sambir, Drohobych, Stry, the 26th Army was deployed. The 63rd SAD was operationally subordinated to the army, which was to include four air regiments (20th, 91st, 165th IAP, 62nd ShAP). In accordance with the "Plan for the use of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front", mentioned in the previous chapter, dated May 31, 1941, "63 SAD is concentrating under its own power. Readiness for action from old airfields in 1-2 hours, from new ones - in 6 hours. If 20 IAP and 91 IAP are located in Proskurov and Sudilkovo by the announcement of mobilization, then their air bases will be transferred by railway, and the readiness of these two regiments will be delayed until the second half of M-2. As you know, the war began at a moment determined by the plans of the German, and not the Soviet command, and the relocation of the 20th and 91st regiments to the west did not take place; these regiments

were included in the 17th SAD and met the beginning of the war in the Proskurov region (i.e., in the "old Soviet" part of Ukraine). The 63rd SAD actually included only two regiments: the 165th IAP (4 I-16, 26 I-153 and 8 I-15bis, 51 pilots) and the 62nd ShAP (55 I-153 and 9 I-15bis, 87 pilots).

Against the background of other formations of the Air Force of the Kiev District, the 63rd SAD looked very "pale" - only two regiments, obsolete (without quotes) aircraft, an overabundance of pilots with an incomplete set of materiel. Unfortunately, on the morning of the first day of the war, the materiel became even less. At the base airfield of the 62nd ShAP (Lisyatyche, 12 km northeast of Stryi), events took place that can be considered a textbook example of a "sudden strike on peacefully sleeping airfields". The operational report (without a number and without a date, on a telegraph tape and for some reason from Stanislav) reports:

"62nd ShAP was attacked for the first time at the time of the announcement of a combat alert according to the plan (as in the text. - M.S.) of the commander of the 63rd SAD and in

further attacked two more times. The enemy Air Force attacks in the regiment destroyed about 45 I-153 combat aircraft, not counting training and training aircraft. At this time, the regiment has only 12 I-153 aircraft ... "(244) At 21.00 on June 22, the

commander of the Air Force of the 26th Army, Colonel Makovsky, sent the following combat report to the headquarters of the Air Force of the front: "I am clarifying

the data on the attack on the Lisiatyche airfield. The enemy attacked the planes with small bombs weighing about 2 kg and packets of flammable liquid (???). Approach to the airfield at an altitude of 200 meters, attack at an altitude of 50 meters. On average, two visits are made. 2 people were killed in the regiment, 23 were wounded (the number of dead and wounded pilots was not indicated in the report. - M.S.), 1 was missing. 41 combat aircraft disabled. There are 17 serviceable aircraft left ... "[278]

The "updated data" gives a clear answer to the question of why the effectiveness of the German attack on the Lisiatyche airfield turned out to be so high: heavy twin-engine Ju-88 bombers from the KG-51 squadron "attacked at a height of 50 meters." On the other hand, the "updated data" does not match the data from a slightly later document. Judging by the "List of loss of aircraft materiel in parts of the 63rd MAD", signed by the chief of staff of the 63rd MAD, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolayshvili, as of 7.00 25.6.41, only 27 aircraft were listed in the "destroyed at the airfield" column.[279]

This figure is quite consistent with the combat report of the headquarters of the 63rd SAD, according to which the following was lost in the 62nd ShAP at the airfield:

June 22 - 23 aircraft, June 23 - 4 aircraft, June 24 - 0.[280] It can be assumed with a fairly high probability that in the panic messages of June 22, the list of "45 combat aircraft destroyed" also included aircraft that received minor, quickly repairable damage. This is indirectly confirmed by the caliber of the ammunition used by the Germans: "small bombs weighing about 2 kg" are the German aviation fragmentation bomb SD 2. In terms of damaging effect, it corresponded to a hand-held anti-personnel grenade and could disable the aircraft for a long time only with a direct hit (in the future, this ammunition was completely removed from service with the Luftwaffe, because the design did not provide

reliable protection against spontaneous explosion in the bomb bay of the carrier aircraft).

Be that as it may, but even in the event of such a unique success, which fell to the lot of the Germans during the strike on the Lisiatyche airfield, 15–20 combat-ready aircraft and many times more pilots remained in the 62nd ShAP. The second regiment of the 63rd SAD (165th IAP, Berezhnitsa airfield, 9 km southwest of Sambir) almost did not suffer from the first Luftwaffe raids - during the first three days of the war it lost two planes on the ground, not a single one in the air. Even without taking into account the obsolete I-15bis, the regiment still had about 28 serviceable fighters and fifty pilots. Is it a lot? In three groups, the only JG-3 fighter squadron in the 5th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe by the beginning of hostilities, there were 28, 32 and 34 serviceable aircraft,

respectively. However, after June 27, any mention of the hostilities (and even the very existence) of the 63rd SAD disappear from the documents of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front. In the "Summary of destroyed enemy aircraft by units of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front for the period 22.6 - 12.7.41" signed by General Astakhov. this division as a whole, as well as the 62nd ShAP and the 165th IAP, are not even mentioned.[281] So, "like a dream, like a morning mist", the huge numerical superiority of Soviet aviation melted in the sky of

If the 36th, 64th and 63rd air divisions in the first days of the war turned out to be not so much the subject of the battle as the object of defeat, then the 17th SAD, 18th DBAD, 19th BAD and 44th IAD located in the depths of the operational formation of the Air Force of the front almost completely (with a few individual exceptions, which will be discussed

below) were inactive. Taking into account the 20th and 91st IAP that ended up in its composition, on the eve of the war, the 17th SAD turned into a huge, perhaps the largest unit in the Soviet Air Force. The division had two fighter and five bomber regiments; moreover, judging by the first operational reports, for some reason a front-line reconnaissance regiment (316th RAP) was also transferred to the division. True, a closer look reveals that there were no aircraft at all in the 244th BAP, and 3 SBs were listed in the 242nd BAP. The 224th BAP (9 SB) and the 225th BAP (11 SB) were slightly better equipped.

In fact, the only combat-ready bomber regiment of the division was the 48th BAP (Koskov airfield, 25 km south of Shepetovka), which on the eve of the war had 34 Pe-2s and 8 SBs, 56 combat-ready crews. The 20th IAP was re-equipped from "gulls" to the Yak-1 (there were 63 of them by the beginning of hostilities) and was the only regiment in the entire Soviet Air Force grouping in the Western theater that received a complete set of these, in the future, the most massive fighters. As in most of these cases, the 20th IAP also had a large number of "old type fighters" (26 I-153 units). The 91st IAP met the war on "seagulls" (59 I-153, 64 pilots, including 32 "night lights" - according to this indicator, the regiment was one of the top three fighter regiments of the KOVO Air Force). (230) The figures given in the previous paragraph are taken from the report of the Commander of the Yu-3 Air Force. front of General Astakhov, who probably used pre-war documents compiled by his predecessors. However, already in the first operational report of the headquarters of the 17th SAD, we see a much smaller number of serviceable combat aircraft: 46 (instead of 63) Yak-1 and 9 (instead of 26) "old types" in the 20th IAP, 43 (instead of 59) I-153 in the 91st IAP (both regiments were based at the Proskurov airfield hub). This reduction in numbers could in no way be connected with losses in battle - there was no battle: "Operational report No. 01. Headquarters 17 AD. Proskurov, 18.0022.6.41

1. At 4.15, at the signal of the commander of the Air Force KOVO, parts of the 17 SAD were put on alert by

5.30. 2. During the day, 20 IAP and 91 IAP patrolled in the air in separate aircraft and units and flew to intercept the sighted (an expression from aviation jargon; means a situation when a fighter takes off at a time when an enemy aircraft is within line of sight from the airfield. - M.S.) enemy aircraft. The bomber regiments did not carry out sorties. 316 RAP made 2 sorties for reconnaissance.

3. At 12.10 an enemy plane of the Heinkel type dropped 3 bombs on the railway echelon at st. Greeks, 12 people were wounded. At 15.20 an enemy plane of the Heinkel type passed over the airfield to Proskurov, dropped 4 bombs into the forest outside the city ... "

Neither losses of fighters in the air, nor enemy air raids on base airfields are recorded by the Operational Report. It remains to be assumed that from the first hours of the war, an "emergency drop" began - exactly the same as in the Air Force units of the Odessa District. There were no victories in the air either - according to the above-mentioned "Summary of destroyed enemy aircraft", attached to the report of the commander of the Air Force of the Astakhov Front, there were no victories either on the first day or in the first week of the war. The command of the division and the Air Force of the front patiently waited for the moment when the "skating rink" of the German offensive would reach Shepetovka and Berdichev; fighter pilots disciplined "ironed the air" over the airfields.

Even further to the east, in the Vinnitsa-Uman region, the 44th IAD was based. The division included the 88th IAP (71 I-16, 51 pilots) and three emerging regiments (248, 249 and 252), which were armed with 20 "donkeys", 56 "gulls" and 15 obsolete I-15s. In total (including the headquarters link and excluding the I-15), there were 147 combat aircraft in the division. (230) The number of fighter pilots in the regiments being formed was constantly changing, which resulted in a discrepancy in information in various documents. Judging by the Operative report No. 1 of the headquarters of the 44th IAD dated 21.00 on June 22, the combat strength of these regiments included 22, 22, 21 pilots, respectively. On the first day of the war, the division was practically inactive:

"For the period from 4.00 to 19.30 22.6, the regiments of the 44 IAD did not carry out any combat work, with the exception of sorties of 88 IAP for interception, 248 IAP for patrolling. There are no losses ."[282]—

It was also not possible to find traces of combat operations of three bomber divisions (62nd BAD, 18th BAD, 19th BAD) in the documents on June 22. It remains to be assumed that the huge (10 more than 450 serviceable aircraft) spent grouping of regiments, bomber aviation of the Southwestern Front, the longest day of 1941 inactive. Here it is worth recalling once again that in the pre-war plans for the use of the Kiev District Air Force, the phrase is constantly repeated: "Readiness for action from old airfields in 1-2 hours, from new ones - in 6 hours." And the distance from Zamostye to Kyiv is exactly equal to the distance from Kyiv to Zamostye. Even without any redeployment, operating "from old airfields", SB and DB-Zf bombers could cover a distance of 450

500 km, separating them from the airfields of the Luftwaffe in southern Poland, and returning back by no means with empty fuel tanks ...

“The reaction of the Red Army to the German invasion,” writes Viktor Suvorov, “is not the reaction of a hedgehog bristling with thorns, but the reaction of a huge crocodile, which, bleeding, is trying to attack.” Without being distracted by the discussion of the problem on the scale of the entire Red Army, we note that in the case of the Air Force of the Kyiv District, the "huge crocodile" did not even try to attack. The aviation of the Southwestern delivered pre-war plan Front did not begin to solve the problem (“by successive strikes of military aviation on established bases and airfields, as well as actions in the air to destroy enemy aircraft”), the aviation of the Southwestern Front did not start - neither on the first, nor on the second, nor on the third day of the war. Why (and for whom) these plans were written remains a mystery of history.

The drafters of the “Plan for the Use of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front” (dated May 31, 1941) expected to find “total against the S\$F on the territory of Germany, Hungary and Romania taken together”, 250 airfields and landing sites, and directly in the zone of the proposed offensive 5th, 6th and 26th armies, from Deblin to Krosno - 70 airfields and sites. In fact, the entire 5th Luftwaffe air corps "huddled" at eight large airfields located no further than 50-100 km from the border, and was an ideal target for an air strike (only moving in the first days of July 41st to the airfields of the Kiev OVO, the Germans got some freedom of maneuver). However, as the Front Air Force Commander wrote in his report on August 21, 1941, “during the period 22.6–1.7.41, the Air Force of the Southwestern Front carried out very few raids on enemy airfields.” In the reports of the 5th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe for June 1941, in the column "destroyed at the airfields by enemy aircraft" there is a short but eloquent dash.

Continuing the line of zoological metaphors begun by V. Suvorov, I would consider it more appropriate to depict a brontosaurus attacked by a flock of prehistoric protowolves. A huge, multi-ton carcass on paws bending under its own weight is already starting to bleed, and a small head with a tiny brain is still trying to look around and understand: what happened? At the same time, the giant tail beats in convulsive

convulsions and "in one touch" kills wolves that accidentally find themselves in the

affected area. Of course, the same idea can be expressed much more decently. For example, as Marshal Bagramyan does in his memoirs (at the time the war began, he was a colonel, head of the Operations Department of the headquarters

of the Kiev Regional Military District): "The front air force commander and his headquarters, meanwhile, sought to establish control over air units. That was not easy. With sudden air strikes, the enemy inflicted significant damage on our aircraft fleet in the very first hours of the attack, disrupted communications between the command and the airfields. The commanders of the aviation divisions acted at their own peril and risk. Over the battlefield one could see small groups of our aircraft, led by desperate daredevils. Despite their small numbers, they selflessly rushed at enemy aircraft and fought from [283] last —

strength ... "Small groups of desperate daredevils - this is what the huge aviation group turned into - not only "selflessly rushed at enemy aircraft", but also inflicted huge (in his, the enemy's, "huge") losses. The day of June 22, 1941 became the day of the heaviest losses for the 5th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe! Accurate, up to one unit, calculation of combat losses

of aircraft is hardly possible. Inevitably, there is uncertainty associated with the interpretation of the available information - it is far from always possible to strictly distinguish between an accident due to technical reasons and damage from the enemy's impact. If the reporting document states: "damaged due to landing gear failure", then what is behind this? A factory defect, a mistake by a wounded pilot, damage to the landing gear release mechanism, a fragment of an anti-aircraft shell? It is unlikely that in a combat situation someone will deal with this trial even if they land at their own airfield; if the plane made an emergency landing (or simply crashed) on the territory controlled by the enemy, then it will never be possible to establish the true cause of the loss of the aircraft. To this it remains to add the inevitable incompleteness and unreliability of the source documents themselves, drawn up in the heat of hostilities.

With all these reservations, we can draw the following picture of German losses on June 22, 1941, which by no means claims to be absolutely accurate.

The KG-51 bomber squadron suffered the heaviest damage. Irretrievably lost over the territory controlled by the enemy (100% according to the German accounting system), 15 Junkers; 54 people of the flight crew died or went missing - there were no such one-day losses in the squadron from the beginning to the end of the World War! (297) Particularly heavy losses were suffered by the 3rd air group of the squadron - 9 aircraft were irretrievably lost (out of 28 combat-ready for the start of the campaign); in percentage terms, these losses are in no way inferior to the real irretrievable losses of the air regiments of the Kyiv OTY Air Force, which suffered the most from the German strike on June 22, 19

In addition to 15 irretrievably shot down, three more KG-51 bombers received damage of varying severity on June 22 (at least one of them was able to reach the airfield in Krosno). It only remains to add that the squadron was equipped with Junkers

Ju-88 of the latest modification of the A-5, which, according to the authoritative opinion of domestic (and many Western experts who joined them), our hopelessly outdated "donkeys" and "seagulls" could not even catch up, but even having caught up, they could not shoot down, because. their armament - ShKAS machine guns of a 7.62-mm rifle caliber - were useless, "humane"

weapons ... A really slow-moving (albeit very maneuverable) "seagull" mentioned here for a reason. The fact is that

June 22, 1941 squadron KG-51 operated on the northern (left) flank of the Southwestern Front. During the first raid, the airfields Stryj (Stry), Lesietztsche (Lisiatyche), Buschow (Bovshev), Chodorow (Khodorov), Tremblowla (Trembovlya), Buczacz (Buchach) were attacked. (297) The first three are the base airfields of the 62nd ShAP from the 63rd SAD and the 12th IAP from the 64th IAD, these regiments were armed mainly with "seagulls" (only in the 12th IAP there were 19 "donkeys"). Trembovlya and Buchach are the base area of the 87th IAP from the 16th SAD (armed with I-16

fighters). From the German report, the places of loss of 5 downed Junkers of the KG-51 squadron are known, the place of death of another 10 is indicated by a question mark. One Ju-88 was shot down in the Zloche

this loss can be attributed with a high degree of probability to the actions of the 15th SAD armed with the latest "flashlights". Three "Junkers" were shot down in the Tarnopol area (they were most likely shot down by "donkeys" of the 87th IAP or "seagulls" of the 92nd IAP of the 16th SAD); another one was shot down in the Stryi region, i.e., in the area where the 62nd ShAP armed with "seagulls" was based. The remaining 10 Junkers shot down are probably the result of the actions of "small groups of aircraft led by desperate daredevils" from the 12th IAP and the 62nd ShAP. Perhaps, the information indicated in the Operations Report of the 12th Army headquarters about 11 enemy aircraft shot down by fighters of the 12th IAP, and the stories about two aerial rams committed on June 22 by pilots of the 62nd ShAP are not so exaggerated.

In second place in terms of losses on the first day of the war was the KG-55 bomber squadron. Irretrievably (100%) lost 11 Heinkels. Two more Non-111s were damaged (the degree of damage was not indicated) by shelling of the enemy in the air, and one Non-111 made an emergency landing at the Klemensow airfield (Zamosc region) with damage estimated at 25% ("requires medium repair work performed by the units"). In addition, he received serious damage (40%) Me-110 squadron headquarters. The KG-54 bomber squadron managed, one might say,

with a "light fright" - two Junkers were lost forever, three returned to the Lublin airfield with minor (12-20%) damage, one with difficulty dragged across the border and with 45% damage made forced landing at Krasnystav (approximately in the middle between Lublin and Zamosc), the fifth of the damaged ones was fired upon in the air in the Rovno region.

Total - 28 irretrievably lost bombers. For the frail forces of the 5th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe, this meant the prospect of losing all the bombers available at the beginning of the campaign in less than 10 days. The losses of the JG-3

fighter squadron were much less (although the reasons for the losses are formulated in the report much less clearly) Five "Messers" were lost irretrievably (100%). The cause of the loss and the place of the fall of three fighters are unknown, which makes it possible to consider them shot down in a battle over Soviet territory with sufficient certainty. One burned out on takeoff from the Oak airfield, another ran out of fuel and crashed. Seven Fighters

returned to their airfields with damage of varying severity (from 20 to 45%), the eighth was damaged (15%) by the explosion of their own bombs at the Moderovka airfield (Krosno area). Thus,

even with the most rigorous approach to interpreting primary documents, it can be stated that on June 22 the Germans lost at least 30 combat aircraft from enemy influence (light reconnaissance aircraft, spotters, sanitary, communications and transport aircraft of military aviation were not included in this list of losses) . Comparing this figure with our, not entirely serious calculation, given at the beginning of this chapter, it is easy to see that the actual losses of the Luftwaffe turned out to be twice as high as the "calculated" ones! We emphasize once again that we are talking about irretrievable losses - taking into account the damaged machines, the total losses of the day reach 50 aircraft.

Noteworthy is the ratio of combat losses of German fighters and bombers: one to ten. Behind this arithmetic lies the extreme recklessness and arrogance shown by the Luftwaffe headquarters both on the operational (allocation of a single fighter squadron to fight in the air in a huge theater of operations) and on the tactical (the bombers were sent on the first sorties in small groups and without fighter escort) level. In any case, the JG-3 fighters completely failed in their main task - to provide cover in the air for the actions of strike aircraft - that day.

Where and under what circumstances did the Germans suffer such losses? The available information makes it possible, although by no means to a full extent, to answer this question as well. If we sum up all (both irretrievably shot down and damaged) German aircraft for which the place of battle (losses, damage) is indicated, then it turns out that they were attacked in the lane of the 14th SAD (Kovel, Lutsk, Dubno), 15th GARDEN (Lviv, Zlochev) and 16th GARDEN (Tarnopol, Buchach). There is no need to talk about the great accuracy of such an assessment (in many cases the place of the air battle is unknown), but even it gives reason to assume that the main events of the war in the air took place where they should have been expected - in the zone of the main attack of the German GA "South" , on the adjacent flanks of the 5th and 6th armies of the Southwestern Front.

Yes, aviation is the most mobile branch of the armed forces, and from Sambor, Stanislav and Proskurov to the Brody-Dubno region, no more than 150-200 km in a straight line (and it is not necessary to fly along a curve in the air). Accordingly, the fighters of the 63rd, 64th and 17th air divisions could theoretically take part in the struggle for air supremacy over the main battlefield of the Southwestern Front, without even changing their base airfields (the 44th IAD would have to be relocated, to which, according to pre-war plans were given no more than 2-3 days). However, this "theory" has not been translated into practice. Only the 14th, 15th, and 16th air divisions that found themselves (not according to the plan of the Soviet command, but "due to the prevailing situation") at the epicenter of events bore the brunt of the air battles of the first week of the war. About how it was, and will be dis

3.3. 14th GARDEN. A short history of defeat

In historiography, as in any other craft, certain traditions have developed. It is necessary to begin the presentation with primary documents, with operational reports and combat reports. Summarize with a quote from the commander's report. And already at the end of everything, to illustrate what has been said, you can add a fragment of the memories of an eyewitness to the events. However, in the story of the defeat of the 14th SAD, I consider it necessary to break this order. We will start with a multi-page quote from the memoirs of two participants in the events: fighter pilot, Hero of the Soviet Union F.F. Archipenko (at the beginning of the war - a junior lieutenant in the 17th IAP) and mechanic A.P. Bilenko (at that time a lieutenant technician in the 89th IAP). Only taking into account these "living pictures" it becomes possible to understand the real content of operational reports, to assess their completeness and

"I had to be on duty at the airfield from 21 to 22 June 1941. At that time, one (very strange statement. - M.S.) I-153 "Chaika" aircraft with a pilot was allocated for duty, and on that sadly memorable night, Senior Lieutenant Ibragimov, my flight commander, was on duty. On June 22, at 04:25, everything around shuddered from explosions, and a group of German bombers up to 60 aircraft dealt a crushing blow to the airfield. Before they had time to recover from the first blow, a second raid was made on the airfield. We could not resist the bombers' attacks: the flight crew was in Kovel with their relatives, and there was no anti-aircraft artillery near the airfield ...

Gradually, flight and technical personnel began to arrive at the airfield, individual sorties of our pilots began. Until noon, our airfield was subjected to massive bombardment four times. In fact, in this difficult situation, there was no leadership at the airfield. I, the operational duty officer at the airfield, junior lieutenant Fedor Arkhipenko, clumsily tried to organize rare sorties and evacuate wrecked vehicles. The connection was broken, there were no instructions and orders, only internal

telephone lines, laid to the parking lot of the air squadron, survived by some miracle.

At about 1 pm, a participant in air battles in Spain, deputy commander of the 14th IAD, Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Alekseevich Lakeev flew to the airfield. Arriving at the command post, the general took command into his own hands ... At the command post, except for the general, me and two signalmen, there was no one ... At about 2 p.m., when the commander of the 17th IAP arrived there (the report of the commander of the 14th SAD states that that the regiment commander arrived at the regiment "from vacation" only on June 29. - M.S.), he released me from

the command post. I hurried to my plane, it turned out to be intact ... In the early morning of June 23, we were at the airfield. There were 25-30 serviceable aircraft... On this day, the old pilots flew to bomb and attack the enemy columns that were moving towards Lutsk, and I helped the technical staff hang the bombs. I was not allowed to fly, because I had not completed a bombing training course and was considered unprepared for such tasks. In general, the second day of the war passed quietly for the regiment, the Germans did not touch the airfield, only scouts flew over it.

But on the morning of the third day, a dozen Me-109 fighters flew in. They stood in two circles: six planes with the right bank and six planes with the left bank and stormed, as at a training ground. The shelling was accurate, confident, as if on targets. As a result, 10 serviceable I-153s and one MiG-1 remained at the airfield, all other machines, about 150 in number, were damaged. Among them were old I-15bis aircraft with non-retractable landing gear, which were lined up and were not dispersed, MiGs, our Seagulls, and aircraft from the Zhytomyr Aviation Regiment.

Our airfield, it seems, was already surrounded, since the Germans were in the Lutsk region at that time. The command decided to transfer serviceable planes to the Kolka alternate airfield, not far from Rovno (probably a mistake was made in the name of the airfield. - M.S.), and ten aircraft, one by one, took off from the airfield riddled with bombs. Us, "horseless", led by Major Deputy. In the evening, Vishnyakov, the commander of the air squadron for political affairs, was put in a lorry and sent to the east. Where they were going, no one except the major knew and did not ask. rode with a big

Cautiously, holding weapons at the ready, German landing forces seemed to be everywhere.
[\[284\]](#)

Without any special adventures, we reached Kolki, where a new order awaited us - to proceed to the Zhytomyr region. At the Zhytomyr airfield, a lot of aircraft of various types from border airfields were concentrated. Our 17th Aviation Regiment was represented there by six I-153 aircraft - that was all that was left of the regiment after a few days of the war. We spent the whole day at the airfield, and in the evening we received an order to take off to cover the Shepetovka station. I was also included in this flight. We took off, gathered in a group of six planes, I don't remember who was leading, went to Shepetovka at a low level flight and so made several circles over it. Of course, our group could not interfere with the enemy aircraft, because he bombed objects from 3000 meters. Our flight was tactically illiterate. The landing was made at dusk, gasoline was burned on the ground, the ground was illuminated for us near the landing "T", and we all landed successfully. We just taxied to the parking lot, immediately the command was to get into the car. We, the unfortunates, got into the back, and we were taken to no one

knows where. In the morning we found ourselves in Kiev, and in the evening they sent us even [\[285\]](#) further, to Moscow ... "In both the first and second editions of the book "On peacefully sleeping airfields", I accompanied this story with the words: "Such a text can (and !) to be used in the classroom in military schools as an educational task: "Name all the points and paragraphs of the Charters and Instructions that were violated in the 17th IAP." Moreover, even had the imprudence [I](#)

to twice express the naive assumption that the terrifying mess, so ingenuously described by the author of the memoirs, was for the Air Force of the Kiev District "a phenomenon rather unique than typical." If only... Arkhipenko's memoirs were published for the first time in 1999, and the mechanic of the 89th IAP A.P. Bilenko passed away in 1990; he recorded his memoirs even earlier, in the early 80s. Thus, both direct and unconscious copying of episodes from Arkhipenko's book is completely excluded, however, in the description of the events of the first day of the war in the 89th IAP, the story of the defeat of the 17th IAP is repeated to within

trifles: and the pilots "left to their wives in the city", and they returned to the airfield 10 hours after the combat alarm ...

60 km from the camp. Everyone who remained in the camp began to carefully prepare for the dances, because someone spread a rumor that many girls from Kolka would come to our camp to dance and to the cinema ... At three o'clock in the morning a combat alert was announced, we were all in a matter of minutes ran out to the airfield to their aircraft and prepared them for launch, and the flight crew prepared for takeoff. However, there was no command to take off - neither at the very beginning of the alarm, nor in the future.

About forty minutes after the announcement of the alarm, we heard the growing rumble of aircraft and immediately saw twelve black, like crows, aircraft going at low level. They made their way to the airfield by thieves, from behind the forest at a low altitude, thanks to which we heard their rumble when they were already on the outskirts of the airfield. Approaching the airfield, the planes divided into four units of three planes and began to process us (bombing) ... At the time of the bombing, the gunners of nine aircraft were pouring machine-gun fire on the personnel and aircraft. Being in the fourth squadron, which was stationed in the far corner of the airfield, above the river itself, we watched the wood chips from our planes fly upwards in the first squadron, we heard noise and screams from there, but we still could not believe that the war had begun, and we stood, open-mouthed, and argued that these were our bombers ...

I have already said that all of us were not shot and did not sniff gunpowder and are so naive that even now, after 39 years, I am amazed at this naivety. When the gunners of the German planes began to pour on us from the machine guns of nine planes (and this was at dawn), we heard the bullets whistling, and stood, admiring the paths of the bullets: red, green, as normal people admire fireworks. We stood and watched as these multi-colored tracks slowly stretched towards us with their tongues and imperceptibly disappeared. Only much later did it dawn on us that for this curiosity one could pay with one's life. The first raid kind of woke us

from sleep, shook us up and at the same time inflicted the greatest damage on us. We've lost more

twenty aircraft were killed and wounded. I can't say whether it was by accident or intentionally, but on many aircraft the guns were removed under the guise of some kind of alterations or improvements. After the first raid, we urgently began to dig trenches for ourselves, soldiers from the airfield maintenance battalion appeared with rifles, then our minders also had rifles. In addition, we mounted several ShKAS machine guns taken from aircraft on tripods. The Germans did not keep themselves waiting long. 40 minutes later, the second blow followed, only with a "nine". This "nine" proceeded away from the airfield to the east, and then came in from the east and subjected the airfield to a daring bombardment. After some time, several dive bombers, also coming from the east, hit the airfield with aimed fire from a high altitude. So, until one o'clock in the afternoon, the airfield was bombed five times. At one o'clock in the afternoon, a group of flight and technical personnel in two trucks left for Lutsk to our

permanent airfield, where the remaining planes were supposed to fly. I left with this group. But most of the personnel remained at the airfield to evacuate aircraft and property. By this time, those officers who had gone to their wives the previous evening had also come here. Having driven four or five kilometers from the airfield, we drove into the village of Peski, large in those places, which really stood on very sandy ground. As soon as we entered the village, we were immediately fired upon from the attics by the Banderists ... By five o'clock in the evening, about twenty-five remaining intact aircraft flew to the airfield in Lutsk. The rest of the sixty aircraft were either damaged and urgently restored or completely destroyed.

At the airfield in Lutsk that day, the pilots managed to make a couple of sorties. On one of these sorties, my pilot did not return to the airfield (that is, the pilot whose plane was served by the author of the memoirs. - M.S.). I have already forgotten his name, since we did not have time to really become friends with him. I only know that he was a Muscovite, had an unbalanced character, always talked a lot, was always dissatisfied with something. In the air he engaged in arrogance. It was often worked out by the flight commander and squadron commander, and sometimes it came to

regiment commander. The pilots who flew with him on the mission told me that when he returned from the mission, he deviated from the link, waved his wings and went west. Like it or not, I don't know, but it looked like him ...

On the second day, the pilots took off at dawn, but, it seems to me, not to carry out any task of resisting the Germans, but, most likely, to get acquainted with the state of affairs in our sector. On the second day, the pilots flew a lot somewhere; returning to the airfield, they fled to the command post, while the mechanics inspected and refueled the aircraft. And again in flight. Since there were more pilots than planes, sorties were made without a break for the planes, we did not have time to refuel and load the planes ...

At four or five in the evening, 24 bombers and more than 30 fighters attacked the city [Lutsk]. Some of them flew to the airfield. However, having considered that the airfield was empty, there were no planes on it, and the hangars, obviously, considered that they would need them, and did not bomb. Several planes dropped their bombs on the trenches that we had already dug for ourselves, and flew away. But the fighters mocked us with impunity, literally chased each of us and taught us a lesson ...

After the raid, there was a command at the airfield for everyone to urgently gather in a military camp, where there were barracks and warehouses. There was already an evacuation of property from warehouses and personnel. The cars were quickly loaded, in my opinion, with the first property that came across, several people sat on top and left. Most of the personnel left earlier, including those who remained at the field airfield. The chief engineer of the regiment, Toropov, ordered me to select several boxes of basic spare parts from the warehouses, for which, as if a car would come right now. However, there was no car. Demolition infantrymen appeared here and kicked me out of the warehouse. I jumped out of

the gates of the town, there was a truck, on which the employees of the headquarters of the air division were leaving. The engineer of the regiment, Toropov, and the engineer of the division, Losev, were there. Leaving the airfield, I grabbed a rifle with a bayonet lying there. When I got on the car, I handed this rifle to Losev, and I myself took the side of the car to get into it. The car at that time rushed forward strongly, I

stumbled and fell. I heard how some officers shouted: "Stop the car," but the car immediately picked up speed. This happened in front of the foot soldiers, who told me: "Nothing, lieutenant, do not grieve, stay with us."

Thinking about what to do and where to

go, I stood for some time at the gates of the town, where the road from the airfield to the town passed. I knew absolutely nothing - where our regiment had flown to and where I should move on. Suddenly, out of nowhere, a gas tanker appeared, in the cockpit of which, in addition to the driver, sat a lieutenant I knew from the airfield maintenance battalion. I stopped them and asked them to pick me up, explaining to them that I was left alone and did not know where and how to get to the regiment. Since it was impossible for a third person to get into the cabin, I lay down on a ladder that ran along the top of the tank, designed for ease of maintenance. The tank was brand new, unused and fully filled with aviation gasoline ... Single shots were heard from the forest on passing cars, which was evident from the bullet tracks, but we

managed to pass safely. In the morning we arrived at the airfield, which was located along the estate of the state farm, 12 kilometers from the city of Rovno. It was said that it was the estate of some landowner. This place was called Voronovo... Upon arrival in Voronovo, we prepared planes for flights during the day, and the flight crew was constantly flying somewhere on missions. Losses were three aircraft. In addition, three aircraft were shot down and required repair. On that day, the Germans did not find our airfield, and we managed without bombing.

In the evening, the planes of our regiment flew away and never returned to this airfield. Many mechanics did not know that the planes would no longer return to this airfield, including myself. After waiting for the return of the aircraft for about an hour, I decided to go from the aircraft parking to the location of the [headquarters] of the regiment and find out the reason for the delay of the aircraft. At this time, a Chaika fighter, not from our regiment, landed at the airfield, the pilot of which called me and asked me to inspect and refuel the aircraft, and he himself ran to the command post. I refueled the plane and upon inspection discovered that a traverse screw had been cut off on the left landing gear, which needed to be replaced. Changing the bolt, I stayed at the airfield for about forty minutes, and w

at the command post, the chief of staff of the regiment, captain Shitikov, attacked me: "Where are you hanging around, hiding, coward, scoundrel! Because of you, the departure of the regiment was delayed by 30 minutes. You need to be spanked!" It turns out that the regiment hastily scrambled from this airfield.

I silently got into the last car, and we set off. Having traveled a little along the airfield, we found that three wrecked I-16 aircraft remained in the first squadron and that they could be put into operation overnight. We decided to leave six mechanics from the first squadron, led by the chief mechanic of the same squadron. Since the regimental headquarters was leaving mysteriously and very hastily, the senior technician expressed his displeasure: "They are leaving it to the Germans to eat." The chief of staff remembered me and transferred one mechanic from the first squadron to our car, and gave me the command to stay. The task before us was set very clearly: to put three wrecked aircraft into operation overnight ...

During the night we commissioned these planes, but in the morning no one flew to us ... No one flew to us the next day either. Then we decided in the evening to overtake the planes ourselves. Three daredevils sat down and overtook the planes to Novograd-Volynsky (not weak, but the mechanics of the 89th IAP had the same training: they could fix the plane in one night, and they even knew how to fly on a very restive donkey. - M.S.) . There, a marked airfield was found on the map (airfield Fedorovka, 13 km east of N-Volynsky. - M.S.). It turned out that our regiment was also at this airfield. The rest of the comrades, after waiting for darkness, decided to go by autostarter to Novograd-Volynsky ...

On both sides of the road there were many refugees with their household belongings. They were old people, children and women, some were sitting, sleeping, some were slowly moving forward, among them were also Red Army soldiers who moved alone and in small groups. Some were with rifles. We drove a little along the main road, and a column of vehicles with Germans overtook us ... Passing by us, the Germans were talking animatedly and laughing loudly. Even now I cannot understand why they did not detain us, because they clearly saw us. In addition, Red Army soldiers with rifles walked along the sides of the road, which the Germans also did not touch. Obviously, other teams were engaged in this business, and they expected that all this mass would not go far, so

how they tanked along the main roads and did not pay attention to the roadsides ...

Upon arrival in Novograd-Volynsky, the senior technician of our group reported to the chief of staff, Captain Shitikov, that we had broken through and arrived safely. The chief of staff attacked the senior technician, calling him a "coward", "alarmist" and so on. In order to somehow justify their flight and cowardice, they began to look for "scapegoats". This role turned out to be a senior technician, whom they also left at the airfield, while they themselves shamefully fled. Captain Shitikov, together with the "special officer" of the regiment, apparently concocted a case

against the senior technician and removed him somewhere ... We immediately left the Novgorod-Volynsky airfield, first to Zhitomir, then, a few hours later, to Pereyaslav-Khmel'nitsky east bank of the Dnieper. - M.S.) through Belaya Tserkov and Kiev ... So the 89th IAP almost completely ceased to exist in 10 days of retreat. No more than 10 aircraft remained in the regiment. Much was lost and the personnel of the regiment: pilots, technicians and junior specialists. Moreover, it seems to me that more of them were lost in this

confusion than died. In my personal opinion (it's hard to disagree with this opinion. - M.S.), at that time in our regiment the organizational work on the part of the chief of staff of the regiment and the commander of the regiment was not up to par. I remember well how much and how bravely the regimental commissar Comrade Zelensky fought. He captivated young pilots with his courage, and they flew with him on missions with great pleasure. However, I do not remember that the regiment commander flew. The command of the regiment in the first days of the war in panic left the next airfield, leaving on it part of the personnel, who, with all their desire, could not return to their own regiment, because they did not even know ~~where~~ where he was relocated ... "[286]

Before moving on from memoirs to reviewing documents that describe the very short combat path of the 14th SAD, a few comments on an issue that is not reflected in the documents. Families. How did the pilots of the air division deployed in Western Ukraine find families in the cities closest to their base airfields? With the rarest exceptions, the wives (and even more so the children) of the commanders of the Red Army were not natives of

Western "liberated" territories. Moreover, contacts (especially close ones) with the "ideologically immature bourgeois population", until the completion of the purge and radical re-education of this population, to put it mildly, were not encouraged (the reader is still waiting for a meeting with very eloquent protocols of party meetings, and it is in one of the regiments 14th GARDEN). Real wives came to Volhynia together with their military husbands and theoretically could be sent to the east, where they left their parents, brothers and

sisters. Unfortunately, even the rumors of an approaching war that filled the air of Western Ukraine, even open threats from local residents ("the Germans will come, they will show you ...") could not overcome the diabolical temptation - shops and sewing studios in the cities of the former Poland" acted stunningly on yesterday's collective farmers. The army, however, lives (should live) according to orders. On December 22, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR issued Order No. 0362, according to which "pilots, navigators and aircraft technicians, regardless of their military ranks, who have been in the Red Army for less than 4 years" were transferred to the barracks position. The pilots, transferred to the barracks, had to spend the night at the location of the military unit. A different arrangement is called "AWOL" in peacetime, and desertion in wartime. Paragraph 7 of order No. 0362 read: "Families of the flight and technical personnel transferred to the barracks should be withdrawn from the territory of military camps by February 1, 1941. The evicted families should be sent home or relocated to local urban and settlement housing stocks outside the location of the air unit ... "It is

noteworthy that the preamble of the order said: "In the current international situation, fraught with all sorts of surprises, the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one is only one step. Our aviation, which will be the first to take up battle with the enemy, must therefore be in a —

state of constant mobilization readiness ... "[287] Golden words. But if already in December 1940 the situation was assessed as "fraught with all sorts of surprises", and therefore, even in distant Siberia or Kazakhstan, pilots were transferred from under the family roof

flight crew fighter regiments, located from the border in 15 minutes of the flight of a low-speed bomber? Can simple slovenliness be so reckless? And why did it take 10 hours to alert and gather pilots on alert? The 14th Air Division had three fighter (17th,

46th and 89th) air regiments and a formation assault regiment (253rd ShAP). The fighter regiments (as can be seen from their serial numbers) were "old", personnel units. Probably, the 17th IAP could be considered one of the best in the district in terms of the level of flight training. "Our regiment," writes Arkhipenko in his

memoirs, "was a 4-squadron armed with I-153 Chaikas. The regiment was commanded by Major Dervyanov[288], holder of the Order of the Red Banner, his deputy was Major Semyonov, who was awarded the Order of Lenin ... Our regiment was so well trained that it took off even at night in formation as part of a squadron. I myself later flew at night, but I never saw anything like this in my life when a squadron took off in formation at night as during the day... Before the war, we flew a lot, doing all kinds of combat training..." Memory did not let the veteran down at all.

Judging by the document ("Historical Form of the Regiment"), the 17th IAP was formed in April 1938, re-equipped with I-153 in October 1939 and began training as a regiment of night fighters. By the start of the war, "40 pilots were fully prepared for combat operations at night in adverse weather conditions," and the regiment in full strength for operations during the day in adverse weather conditions." [289] In June 1940, the regiment became part of the 14th SAD and was relocated to the area of the city of Kovel (airfields Kovel, Lyubitov, Velitsk). Kovel is the most important railway junction of Polissya, through which both the Brest-Lvov highway and the only railway line Kovel-Sarny-Korosten in the 150-km strip south of Pripyat, connecting the border regions of Volyn with the center of the country, passed. Perhaps this was the reason for the deployment of such an outstanding fighter regiment in the Kovel region.

On the eve of the war, the 17th IAP had 53 pilots and 43 serviceable I-153 fighters. Another 4 aircraft needed repair, and 2 cars, broken in accidents, were waiting for overhaul or write-off. Such information is given in the report of the chief of staff of the 14th SAD dated 1

July and the report of the division commander on July 3. (255) True, a few pages further on in the report of the divisional commander, 9 more MiG-3s appear, at least some of which arrived in the last days of peace in the 17th IAP. A huge number of damaged or destroyed aircraft, which Archipenko writes about, was formed as a result of the fact that at the Velitsk airfield (as well as at many other airfields in the western districts) there were dozens of obsolete (or exhausted) aircraft, already withdrawn from the units and waiting to be sent to rear.

The 46th IAP was formed in May 1938, from November 10, 1940 the regiment was commanded by Major I.D. Podgorny. A glorious combat biography awaited this regiment - in the summer of 1943 the regiment became the 68th Guards (the guards banner was awarded on August 4, 1943). On the eve of the war, the regiment included: 63 pilots, 29 I-16s and 28 I-153s, according to the report of the chief of staff of the 14th SAD; according to the report of the division commander - 58 pilots, 24 I-16s and 22 I-153s in good condition, another 4 I-16s and 4

I-153s needed repairs. (255) The regiment was based in the area of Dubno (airfields Mlynov, Granovka). The 89th IAP was somewhat "younger" - formed in 1940 - and much better armed. On the eve of the war, the regiment had (according to various documents) 58, 66, 71 or even 76 donkeys. (218, 230, 255) However, all this inconsistency arose mainly due to differences in accounting for obsolete, in need of repair or to be written off aircraft. The number of combat-ready I-16s is indicated in the range from 47 to 58 units, and they were mainly I-16 "type 28" - the best modification of the legendary fighter, with a 1000-horsepower M-63 engine and cannon armament (two ShVAK cannons in consoles wings). There were more than 60 pilots in the regiment, 36 of them were trained for daytime flights in adverse weather conditions, 12 for night

flights. (230) The 89th IAP was based at the airfields of Lutsk, Kolki, Kivertsy. Thus, according to the most minimal estimate, on the eve of the war in the three fighter regiments of the 14th SAD there were 136 battle-ready aircraft and 172 pilots. As for the emerging 253rd ShAP, this regiment, like all other "caps", was armed with obsolete I-15bis / I-153 biplane fighters. In parentheses, we note that no matter how obsolete

German dive bomber Ju-87, and four rapid-firing (up to 30 rounds per second) ShKAS machine guns, combined with the phenomenal maneuverability of the "seagull" (the time of the steady turn - 13 s), made it possible to very effectively attack the infantry and automobile columns of the enemy. It is

absolutely impossible to understand how many planes and pilots were in the 253rd ShAP by the beginning of the war. Judging by the report of the chief of staff of the 14th SAD on July 1, there are 23 pilots and 12 I-153s in the regiment, including one faulty one. The division commander's report of 3 July states that the regiment had 37 pilots and 12 I-153s, "all out of service." Judging by the report of the commander of the Air Force of the South-Western Front of August 21, on the eve of the war, there was not a single aircraft in the 253rd ShAP and there were only 7 pilots.

"The day before the war," writes Arkhipenko, "an encryption came in allowing the shooting down of German reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, 10-12 days before the war, we were ordered to disperse the planes along the border of the airfield. And then they stood flat. We also dug caponiers and crevices for sheltering personnel ... "We were unable to confirm or refute this message with documents. The first report of the headquarters of the 14th SAD was written by hand, in pencil, on a sheet of paper from a school notebook "in a ruler". There is no number and signature, only the number is indicated - June 22, 1941: "89th IAP. Destroyed at the airfield 6 I-16, 1 did not return from the mission. 12 people were wounded from the bombing. Regiment of 22 aircraft at the airfield in Kivertsy. 46

IAP. 1 I-16 was destroyed at the airfield, 1 did not return from the mission, 1 I-153 was shot down. 11 people injured, 1 killed. Regiment at the airfield

Granovka. 17 IAP. Destroyed 1 I-16, 1 I-153, 1 did not return from the mission. The regiment is based in Wielick. 12 people were injured." (256) According to this document, the "crushing blow to the airfield", so vividly described in the memoirs, inflicted by "a group of German bombers up to 60 aircraft", led to the irretrievable loss of only two aircraft in the 17th IAP. In general, the division lost (on the ground and in the air) 13 aircraft, i.e., a little less than one tenth of the original number of combat-ready fighters. Surprise is only

strange arithmetic of the 89th IAP, in which, after the loss of 7 "donkeys", out of at least 47 serviceable ones, only 22 aircraft remained.

The combat report of June 23 is even shorter: "89th IAP. 3 aircraft were shot down in an air battle (either friendly or enemy. - M.S.). There is no information about other shelves. At 19:20, a flight of Heinkel-111 planes bombed the airfield of the army headquarters, the duty team, the headquarters of the 14th AD.^[290]

The report of the chief of staff of the 14th AD, "Information on the combat and strength of the 14th AD", compiled no earlier than July 1, which was repeatedly mentioned above, could be considered more reliable - a whole week passed after the first day of the war, and information about losses could be that time were refined and rechecked. However, according to this document, there were no irretrievable losses of aircraft in the 89th IAP: as of June 21, there were 51 serviceable and 7 defective aircraft (a total of 58 aircraft), and at the end of the day on June 22 - 45 serviceable and 13 defective aircraft (the same 58). The losses of the 17th IAP are much greater: during the day, the total number of aircraft in the regiment decreased from 49 to 35, of which only 25 remained combat-ready (there were 43 the day before). The 46th IAP, judging by the report, lost 7 I-16s and 9 I-153s on the first day of the war (nothing was said about the number of serviceable and defective aircraft for this regiment). In this case, the number of irretrievable losses of aircraft of the 14th SAD for the first day of the war reaches 30 units.

On June 24, after the recall and arrest of Ptukhin, Colonel Slyusarev took over command of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front. On the same day, he sent (probably the first in his new position) a telegram to Moscow, in which he reported on the status of the units and formations of the Air Force grouping entrusted to him. There are, in particular, mentions of the situation in the 14th SAD: "The combat strength of the 14th AD

by the end of June 23 is 67 aircraft (this is already half of the minimum initial number of serviceable aircraft. - M.S.) with crews ... Especially strong suffered 14 and 15 AD. I have no connection with 14 AD on sutra 24.6 ... I continue. Communication with 14 HELL has now been established. According to the division commander, the situation is grave. I report on the merits. Until recently, they failed to organize the work of the front air force headquarters. Existing employees are engaged in a simple transfer of various information. The operational department formally exists, but the work has not been organized ... I don't have exact data on the combat strength ... The first two days suffered a lot

loss of materiel and especially defective ones on the ground from attacks by enemy fighter and bomber aircraft. I have no [information] about the actual loss of equipment and people, since some of the aircraft land on other airfields, do not report their whereabouts ... I will take all measures [to] fulfill your orders. All". [291]

Alas, the documents show that the task of restoring order, at least in the matter of accounting for losses and the availability of materiel, turned out to be insoluble. On June 27, the chief of staff of the Air Force of the Front, Colonel Tygrebert, signs a report on the combat strength of the Air Force units of the Southwestern Front. If you believe this report, in the three fighter regiments of the 14th SAD, there were 24, 17 and 9 aircraft, respectively, and the 17th IAP and the 46th IAP were allegedly located at the Velitsk airfield, that is, already behind enemy lines (the Germans occupied Lutsk June 25, and by June 28 they reached the line of the Goryn River east of Rovno). (259) True, according to the same report, the 89th IAP, together with the division headquarters, was at the Fedorovka airfield (13 km east of Novograd-Volynsky), which corresponds to both common

sense and A.P. Bilenko. On the same day, June 27, the head of the Operational Department of the Front Air Force Headquarters (i.e., First Deputy Colonel Taygrebert), Major Vladimirov, draws up his report on the combat composition of the Yu-3 Air Force units. front. According to this document, "only 37 aircraft" remained in the 14th SAD (a breakdown of this amount by regiment was not indicated). (260) The next day, June 28, signed by the chief of staff of the 14th AD, Lieutenant Colonel Perminov and the head of the Operations Department of the headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Noskov, a certificate "Information on the status of the materiel of the 14th AD" is issued. (261) According to this document, in one night there were twice as many planes (including the "migratory falcons" mentioned in Slyusarev's telegram). For the convenience of the reader, we summarize the data for three

	I	II	III
17 ПАП	24	?	12 (8+4)
46 ИАП	17	9	11 (8+3)+ 15
89 ИАП	9	9	27 (14+13)+ 7
всего по 14 САД	сумма = 50	«всего 37»	сумма = 72

Note: in the third column, the number of serviceable and defective aircraft is indicated in brackets, the term outside the brackets is "aircraft are in other garrisons".

There is no clarity even on the question of where, in the end, the few remaining planes of the 14th SAD disappeared. Judging by the report of the division chief of staff, "as a result of a large loss of materiel on 28.6.41, all materiel from 17 IAP and 89 IAP was transferred to 46 IAP and 253 SLI. The pilots were sent to Moscow and Kyiv to receive materiel." [292] However, the "Historical Form" of the 46th IAP says: on June 29, the flight crew was sent to Rostov for retraining and receiving LaGG-3. [293] From the report of the division commander it also follows that the 46th IAP did not receive, but, on the contrary, handed over the "remnants" of its materiel to the 253rd ShAP. And if you believe the "Historical Form" of the 17th IAP, then "in July 1941, the regiment transferred materiel in the amount of 12 I-153 to the 92nd IAP (this is a fighter regiment of the 16th SAD. - M.S.) and departed for retraining and retraining at LaGG-3 in Rostov." [294]

In any case, one thing is clear - in early July, the 14th SAD got rid of most of the combat aircraft and actually ended its existence. Opersvodka No. 13 of the Air Force Headquarters of the 5th Army dated July 11 briefly states: "14 AD at the Nizhyn air hub." [295] Nizhyn is a city in the Chernihiv region, 90 km east of the Dnieper, 450 km east of Lutsk. By that time, the division had only 26 "donkeys" and "gulls", of which 14 were out of order. [296] On July 3, 1941, the division headquarters —

was still at the Fedorovka airfield, and there a report (mentioned above) was drawn up by the commander of the 14th SAD, Colonel Zykanov: "I am reporting the status of the units of

the 14th air division by 12.003.7.41. 1. Division control. Pilots - me and my deputy Major General Lakeev. There are no planes.

Destroyed during the bombing of airfields Lutsk and Velitsk. For drunkenness on the night of 22.6.41, lack of proper work, leadership and accounting, Colonel Shumilov, head of the operational department [of the division headquarters], was removed from his

post. 2. 17 IAP. The commander of the regiment, Dervyanov, arrived from vacation on June 29 (seven days of vacation during the outbreak of the war? Or did the vacationer rest in Kamchatka? - M.S.), took command of the regiment. Pilots by 22.6.41—53 people:

- no one was shot down in air
- combat - 4 people were injured in air
- combat - 1 crashed in a crash during takeoff.

Total by 12.00 3.7. 64 in service, 59 of them sent to receive materiel, at the Fedorovka-1 airfield (very strange arithmetic. - M.S.). Materiel: - 5 shot down in air combat

- 3

destroyed in catastrophes and accidents - 11 destroyed at the Velitsk airfield during bombing

enemy

- 6 who had been defeated after an air battle, requiring urgent repairs, remained at the Velitsk airfield - 18

were transferred to the 253rd —

ShAP ... "[297] Here it must be recalled that the 17th IAP started the war on "seagulls"; this biplane fighter with a maximum speed of 440 km / h, without a doubt, was inferior to the German "Messers" of the latest modification F, with which the enemy was armed on that sector of the front. And at the same time, there are no pilots shot down in air combat, and even the number of wounded in air combat is less than the number of downed "gulls". Armed with obsolete fighters, the regiment lost only five I-153s in combat and declared (as can be judged from the "Summary of destroyed enemy aircraft" attached to Astakhov's report of August 21, 1941) 9 enemy aircraft shot down.

And this is just the beginning of miracles! In the "Historical Form" of the regiment, it is stated that "from 22.06 to the reorganization, 668 combat sorties were made, 52 air battles were conducted, 18 enemy aircraft were shot down, while 1 pilot and 1 aircraft were lost." [298] Without even digressing into a discussion of the phenomenal ratio of losses in the air for June 41 (18 to 1), we note an excellent level of combat survivability: 134 sorties for one loss in the air (and this is if we consider the number of "seagulls" shot down in battle to be 5, and not 1). And on what did the pilots of the 17th IAP fly 90 or more sorties a day? Strange, but the compilers of the "Historical Formulary" did not notice that on the next page they reported that for the whole seven months (from May to October) of 1942 the regiment made only 1258 sorties, shot down 16 enemy aircraft and at the same time lost its own 7 pilots and 12 LaGG-3 aircraft.

Returning to the report of Colonel Zykanov, one cannot fail to note the multiple increase in the number of aircraft lost by the 17th IAP at the Velitsk airfield - if according to the first report of June 22 there were only two, then the final figure reached 17. The main component of the "losses" turned out to be ... simple transfer of 18 serviceable fighters to the "neighbors" (253rd regiment)! What was the deep meaning of the transfer of combat aircraft from a fighter regiment, staffed with highly qualified pilots, to the emerging ShAP with a handful of young pilots, the division commander does not explain^v in his report. Further, the report consists of the same type (for each regiment) lists of losses of flight personnel and aircraft. These data are presented in the following two tables:

	Убиты в бою	Не вернулись с боевого задания	Ранены в бою	Погибли в катастрофах	Отправлены за матчастью	В строю
17 ИАП	0	0	4	1	59	1
46 ИАП	3	5	3	0	40	15
89 ИАП	5	1	7	0	41	12
253 ШАП	2	2	1	0	16	16
сумма	10	8	15	1	156	44

Note: in the list of the wounded according to the 89th IAP by the compiler The report also included military equipment.

	Сбиты в бою, не вернулись	Разбиты в авариях и катастрофах	Уничтожены на земле	Повреждены и оставлены на аэр.	Переданы в другой полк	В строю
17 ИАП	5	3	11	6	18	0
46 ИАП	10	0	17	12	11	4
89 ИАП	13	4	40	-	-	19(6+13)
253 ШАП	7	5	0	-	0	22 (9+13)
сумма	35	12	68	18		41 (15+26)
14 САД:	28	12	75	12		44(16+28)

Arithmetic (line "sum" in the above table), as we can see, it does not agree with the number of lost and remaining aircraft indicated in the report throughout the division. On the same page, it is stated that by 12.00 3.7 in the 46th IAP there are "4 combat-ready aircraft" and "as of 12.00 3.7 the 46th regiment of aircraft does not have a single one ...".[299] The figures for the movement of materiel for the 253rd ShAP categorically do not converge either. Judging by Zykanov's report, there were 12 I-153s in the regiment, lost

also 12, received from the 17th and 46th regiments 29 aircraft, after which instead of 29, 22 aircraft are in service.

Moreover, 13 of them are out of order: were faulty aircraft transferred from regiment to regiment? The overall "balance" of the presence and loss of combat aircraft in the division was brought together with the help of "aircraft in need of repair" that unexpectedly appeared on the penultimate page of the report (this is in addition to those indicated as faulty for each quantity

19 pieces and very dubious numbers "destroyed" and "left due to malfunctions" (the airfields indicated in the report - Velitsk, Mlynov, Dubno, Voronov, Lutsk, Kolki - by the time the report was compiled were already behind the front line, and nothing could be checked) . The only thing that is beyond

doubt is three dozen pilots of the 14th SAD, who were killed and wounded in air battles, and 29 Junkers and Heinkels from squadrons actually shot down in June

KG-54 and KG-55 (these formations operated mainly on the northern flank of the Southwestern Front, and the fighter regiments of the 14th SAD contributed to the indicated Luftwaffe loss figures). It is not possible to provide exact data. The division commander's report says: "To date, about 40 enemy aircraft have been shot down, mainly bombers of various types." (270) The report of the front air force commander gives very close figures: 29 shot down in June, 10 - from 1 to 6 July. The last mention of the fate of the

14th SAD and its commander

found in the memoirs of an air marshal

S.A. Krasovsky (with the outbreak of the war, he became the commander of the Air Force of the North Caucasian Military District, namely there, in Rostov-on-Don, and brought the personnel of the division to reorganization):

"... In July, the 14th Air Division arrived from Western Ukraine ... There was a knock on the door of my office, and a pilot appeared before me without military distinctions, in a white silk balaclava, wearing glasses. He kept himself cheeky[300] . - What kind of army-is this? I asked. - Comrade General, commander of the 14th Fighter Division, Colonel Zykanov.

- Try to put on the proper uniform. Zykanov left. I asked the head of the political department: - Do you have all the pilots in this form?

- No, what are you! We have very good people. ... The next day, Colonel Zykanov again arrived at the district air force headquarters. Somewhere he got a cap, a tunic not for his height, a belt. - Now it is clear that you are the commander of the Red Army. And we said hello. - May I call Moscow? Zykanov

asked. - Call. In the course of the conversation, I realized that he was reporting ("over the head" of the senior in position and rank. - M.S.) to a member of the Military Council of the Air Force P.S. Stepanov about the plight of his division. After a minute or two, Zykanov handed me the phone.

"Krasovsky," I heard, "tomorrow send Zykanov to Moscow. Apparently, he will have to be held accountable..."[301]—

It was not possible to establish the further fate of Colonel Zykanov. As for his deputy, Major General I.A. Lakeev (Gold Star No. 63, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded on November 3, 1937 for the courage and heroism shown in battles in the skies of Spain), then nothing terrible happened to him: since the fall of the 41st, he commanded an air regiment in the rank of general (524th IAP) on the Volkhov Front, from April 1943 - commander of the 235th Fighter Aviation Division. After the war, he rose to the position of deputy commander of the 22nd Air Army. He was awarded the military orders of Suvorov 2nd class, Kutuzov 2nd class, Bogdan Khmel'nitsky 2nd class.

3.4. 15th GARDEN. Riddles of arithmetic and geography

If for the Germans the direction of the main attack in Western Ukraine was the Zamostye-Dubno-Zhitomir axis, then the Southwestern Front, according to pre-war plans, was to deliver the main blow somewhat to the south, along the Lvov-Tarnow-Krakow line. It was there, at the tip of the Lvov ledge, in the Brody, Lvov, Sambir zone, that the three most powerful mechanized corps (15th, 4th and 8th) deployed. In the same place, at the numerous airfields of the Lvov air hub, the 15th SAD was based - the division that received the largest (among other Air Force formations in the Kyiv district) number of "new types of fighters".

The division included three fighter regiments (23rd, 28th and 164th) and one assault (66th) regiment. The main striking force of the division was the 23rd IAP and the 28th IAP, "old" personnel air regiments, fully staffed with flight personnel and materiel. As in all other cases, the numbers reflecting the presence of combat aircraft in the regiments differ quite markedly. As of June 1, 1941, the 23rd IAP had 58 MiG-3s (including 7 faulty ones), the 28th IAP had 63 MiG-3s (of which 14 were faulty). Judging by the report of Astakhov, Commander of the Air Force of the Front, by the beginning of hostilities, each regiment had 48 MiG-3s (as one might assume, only combat-ready aircraft were taken into account in Astakhov's report). The report "On the status of units of the 15th SAD", signed on July 8, 1941 by the division commander, Major General Demidov, indicates that by 04.00 on June 22 there were 50 MiG-3s in the 23rd IAP and 52 MiGs in the 28th IAP.^[302] In addition, technically sound old fighters still remained in the regiments: 20 units (13 I-153 and 7 I-16) in the 23rd IAP, 14 donkeys in the 28th IAP.

Each regiment had (according to various documents) from 50 to 60 pilots; in terms of the number of pilots trained for night flights (41 people), the 23rd IAP ranked first in the Air Force of the Kiev OVO, there were many of those in the 28th IAP (26 people). 41 and 33 pilots, respectively, were trained for daytime flights in adverse weather conditions. (230)

The 164th IAP had more than forty fighters of the "old types" (according to Astakhov's report - 28 I-153 and 14 I-16); there were more pilots in the regiment than aircraft (figures in different sources range from 51 to 68). The 66th ShAP was full, 5 squadron, at the disposal of 69 pilots were 58 obsolete I-15bis biplanes and 5 of the latest Il-2 attack aircraft at that time (we note right away that no mention of their participation in hostilities was found in the documents failed). There were many airfields and landing sites as part of the Lvov air hub, but, as can

be judged from the documents, on the eve of the war, the main airfields based for the regiments of the 15th SAD were Adamy (23rd IAP), Chunev (28th IAP), Kurovice (164th IAP), th IAP), Komarno (66th ShAP). For the command of the Luftwaffe, the 15th SAD from the very first hours of the war became the

object of "special attention". Probably, just as in the case of the 149th IAP in Chernivtsi, the Germans were concerned about the large number of the latest enemy fighters, and they tried to disable them at the very beginning of the operation. And since there were few aircraft in the 5th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe, specialized for operations against pinpoint ground targets (Ju-87 dive bomber, Me-110 fighter-bomber), it was not at all [303] for daytime attack on airfields based on fighter regiments of the 15th SAD, the Germans were forced to use the heavy and clumsy Heinkel He-111s from the KG-55 squadron, and in small groups - a suicidal tactic that in other circumstances could lead to heavy losses.

From the early morning of June 22 over the airfields of the Lviv air hub a real air battle unfolded. "Operational report No.

01 of the headquarters of the 15th SAD dated 20.00 on 22.6.41.

The division, from 4.45 to 20.00, conducted air battles in the areas of airfields Chunev, Kurovice, conducted air combat in the Lvov region; all three fighter regiments were involved. The enemy air force continuously attacked the airfields of Chunev, Adamy, Kurovice, 3 times - the airfield of Skyilov, 3 times - Rzhneny. The 23rd

IAP conducted an air battle in the area of Adama. Adama airfield was attacked 7 times by [enemy] fighters and bombers

groups of 3-6 aircraft. Shot down 2 enemy bombers Non-111.

Losses: 1 MiG-3 was shot down in air combat, 1 MiG-3 was shot down by its anti-aircraft artillery, 1 MiG-3 did not return from a combat mission. 4 MiG-3s and 4 I-16s were destroyed on the ground, 6 MiG-3s and 3 I-16s were damaged on the ground. Breakdowns

during landing - 3 MiG-3. 4 pilots were wounded, 1 was killed, the rest of the crew were killed 4, 7 were wounded. tasks. 28 IAP from 4.50 to 20.00 units and groups covered the city of Lvov and the Chunev airfield. Chunev

airfield was attacked 6 times by groups of 3-6 aircraft. As a result of the actions of the 28th IAP, together with the 23rd IAP and 164th IAP, a re-entry (as in the text. - M.S.) of 15 Heinkel bombers at 14.00 on the city of Lvov was repelled, 3 Bf-109 and 2 He-111 were shot down. According to the pilots' reports, 10 [enemy] planes were shot down in the visibility areas of the airfields.

Losses: 3 MiG-3s shot down (according to another report, 2 MiG-3s were shot down on the same day. - MS), 9 MiG-3s were damaged on the ground, 4 MiG-3s landed on the fuselage outside the airfield. A few aircraft may be able to be restored during the night. 2 pilots were killed, 6 were wounded, the rest of the

crew were killed 1. The regiment, consisting of 44 pilots, 9 MiG-3s (where are there at least 27 MiGs? - M.S.) and 5 I-16s at the Chunev airfield, is ready for

execution combat mission. 164 IAP from 04.50 to 20.00 flew in formations and groups to cover the city of Lvov and the Kurovice airfield. The Kurovice airfield was subjected to 4 attacks. 2

He-111s were shot down in air combat. Losses: 1 I-16 was shot down in an air battle, 4 I-16 did not return from a combat mission, 15 aircraft were destroyed and damaged at the airfield. In total, 20 were lost. 1 aircrew was killed, 4 were wounded, including the regiment commander, Major Akulenko.

Regiment consisting of 41 pilots and 23 aircraft at Kurovice and Komarno is ready for action.

66th ShAP flew from the Kurovice airfield to the Komarno airfield in the afternoon. Losses: in air combat shot down 2 destroyed and damaged at the airfield 34 (including 2 Il-2). Pilots killed 2, wounded 4.

... By the decision of the division commander at dawn on 23.6 after the first sortie, all fighter regiments are concentrated in Kurovitsa and will periodically work from it and from their airfields (Adamy for 23 IAP, Chunev for 28 IAP). In the evening twilight, 23 IAP and 28 IAP return to their airfields for the night. The division commander decided to move the command post to the Kurovitsy airfield area. Colonel Skotarenko, Chief of

Staff of the 15th AD.”[304] Summing up the data on—
enemy losses presented in the summary, we get 6 Heinkel
He-111s, 3 Messerschmitts Bf-109s,

and either 5 or 10 aircraft of an unidentified type, shot down on June 22 by fighters of the 15th SAD. In the archives of the 28th IAP, the "Journal of downed enemy aircraft" has been preserved. Judging by it, on June 22, the regiment's pilots shot down 6 enemy aircraft: 4 Bf-109 fighters and two Dornier Do-215s (since there were no bombers of this rather obsolete type in the 5th Air Corps of the Luftwaffe at all, it can be assumed that this is how the twin-engine twin-keeled Me-110s of the KG-55 squadron headquarters were identified).[305] True, the column “documents of the crew of the downed aircraft” and—“serial number of the downed aircraft” in the register remained empty ... Turning to German documents, we can state that the

overestimation of the number of victories declared by the pilots of the 15th SAD is even less than the “normal” ones typical for air battles of the Second World War 2-3-fold values, on June 22, the KG-55 squadron lost forever. A. Isaev, in an article entitled “AntiSolonin-1,” reports, however,

without reference to any sources, that the pilots of the 66th ShAP “considered the alarm on Sunday as a training one and moved slowly to the airfield. Just to see his defeat from the air.

11 Heinkels. Five of them were shot down in the area of Kovel, Lutsk, Dubno, and this can hardly be connected with the actions of the fighters of the 15th SAD. Two Non-111s were shot down directly in the area of Lvov, Zlochev (these enemy losses can be confidently attributed to the victories of the pilots of the 15th SAD - however, if we forget about the existence of a very active Soviet anti-aircraft artillery). The crash site of the two downed Heinkels is unknown, two more are irretrievably listed.

lost from enemy influence, but in the area of the Labunie airfield near Zamosc (drag "on one wing" across the front line, after which the crew left the burning plane?). The JG-3 fighter squadron irretrievably lost 3 Messers over Soviet

territory, which can also be associated with air battles over Lvov. Even two Dorniers, allegedly shot down by fighters of the 28th IAP, can be correlated with one Me-110 of the KG-55 headquarters, which received damage (40%) in battle, and another Me-110 from the long-range reconnaissance detachment 3 (F) 11 shot down (100% loss) in the area designated "Lemberg-Sambow". If we assume that "Sambow" is a misspelled Sambor, then this German aircraft can also be attributed to the number of those shot down by the pilots of the 28th IAP. On June 22, the own losses of the MiGs of the 23rd IAP and the 28th IAP from the enemy's impact in the air turned out to be scanty when compared with the initial number and very high when compared

with the total losses in the first two weeks of the war:

	23 ИАП	28 ИАП
Наличие на 22.6	50	52
Сбиты в воздушных боях	1/2	2/2
Не вернулись с боевого задания	1/5	0/8
Сумма	2/7	2/10

Note: the first figure is the losses on June 22, the second is the losses from 22.6 to 8.7. 41; only MiG-3 losses are taken into account.

In any case, on June 22, for the fighter regiments of the 15th SAD, as in all other parts of the first echelon of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, air losses amounted to only the smallest fraction of the total losses. Not as great as is commonly believed, and the number of aircraft irretrievably destroyed on the first day by the enemy on earth:

	23 ИАП	28 ИАП
Наличие на 4.00 22.6 (самолеты всех типов)	70	66
Сбиты в воздухе, не вернулись с задания	3	3
Аварии и катастрофы	3	0
Уничтожены противником на земле	8	0
Повреждены на земле, вынужденные посадки	9	13
Наличие на 20.00 22.6 (самолеты всех типов)	19	14
«Неучтенная убыль»	28/20	36/27

Note: in the line "unaccounted for loss" the second figure - including the MiG-3.

As you can see, the main (greater than all the others put together) component of the losses was the "unaccounted for loss" (the arithmetic difference between the recorded losses and the actual reduction in the number of combat-ready aircraft reflected in the document). Running a little ahead, we note that such an amazing arithmetic did not last long, and the planes that "disappeared" to no one knows where began to gradually return (at least to return to the pages of combat reports and operational reports of the 15th SAD). By the evening of June 24, the number of serviceable MiGs in two regiments had grown from 23 to 37. These figures correlate with the report of the division commander dated July 1, 1941 (Ref. No. 018), according to which "from June 22 to June 30, forces 11 MiG-3s restored... recovery in the field is impossible: 4 MiG-3s..."[306]

However, this message does not explain in any way the reason for the disappearance without a trace on the first day of the war of 47 MiG-3s (this is in addition to the 22 MiGs damaged on June 22 for various reasons specifically indicated in Operational

Report No. 01). On June 23, a no less strange story with geography began. The order of the division commander of June 22 is not quite clear, according to which "at dawn on June 23, after the first combat mission, all fighter regiments will concentrate in Kurovitsa and will work periodically from it and from their airfields." The generally accepted tactical method is the dispersal of air units over airfields and landing sites, and not at all concentrating them on one airfield, which is known to the enemy for certain.

Whether this order was carried out is unclear. The operational report of the headquarters of the 15th SAD for June 23 could not be found. In the archival fund, after operational summary No. 1, there is a summary No. 3, from which it follows that on the third day of the war, the regiments of the 15th SAD were not at all in Kurovitsa, but at the Zubov airfield - 120 km southeast of Lvov! Who, when and, most importantly, why made the decision to withdraw the air division from the combat zone? The answer (not quite, however, intelligible) to this question we find in the above-mentioned telegram of the new commander of the Air Force of the Front, Colonel Slyusarev, sent to Moscow on June 24, 1941:

"On 15 AD, by order of the commander of the 6th Army, in connection with the threatening situation in the Lvov region, it was relocated to the Tarnopol region, which is (as in the text. - M.S.) and its regiments are at the stage of relocation. The commander of the [Front Air Force] Ptukhin gave the order ... (at this point the phrase breaks off, and Slyusarev begins to report on the situation in the 14th SAD. Then he returns to the story with the relocation: "The commander of the 15th AD with his headquarters, without an exact order, is simple by order of the commander of the 6th army, he was relocated to Tarnopol. 236 received from Ptukhin [an order] to return to the place of his previous deployment. I have no information

about the fulfillment of the order by Demidov (commander of the 15th SAD) ... "All this is very strange. And it's not even that that on June 22–24, nothing particularly "threatening" happened in the Lvov region - the German infantry, with their unhurried offensive, fettered the main forces of the 6th Army there, preventing them from being transferred to the northern flank, into the breakthrough zone of the 1st Wehrmacht Panzer Group. that Army Commander Muzychenko, known for not handing over "his" 4th mechanized corps to participate in a frontal counterattack, and even tried (and not unsuccessfully) to "dig out" the 8th mechanized corps of the left neighbor, refused fighter cover and his own ordered to relocate the 15th GARDEN to the rear, from Lvov to Tarnopol. It is possible that Slyusarev's telegram simply omitted three letters twice, as a result of

which "commander of the Air Force of the 6th Army" turned into "commander of the 6th Army." If you believe (unfortunately, without this "if" it is impossible to discuss the documents of June 41st) "Journal of downed enemy aircraft" of the 28th IAP, then on June 23 (or at least some part of this day) the regiment was still at the Lvov air hub. This can be judged by the geography of the places of air battles, during which [six \[307\]](#) (as well as on the first day of the war) enemy aircraft were shot down: Sanok, Przemyśl, Rava-

Ruska, Grudek-Jagelonski (now Gorodok) - all this west of Lvov. Be that as it may, on June 24, all parts of the 15th SAD were relocated to the area south of Tarnopol (the airfields of Zubov and Popovtse).

By this point, the division had already experienced the first of the inevitable consec

"Operative report No. 03 of the headquarters of the 15th SAD from 20.00 24.6.41, air. Zubov 28 IAP 24.6 in the period from 20.00 to 21.00 (as in the text. - M.S.) covered the actions of the "five" SB from 86 BAPs (bomber regiment of the 16th SAD. - M.S.). He did not conduct combat work until 20.00 due to the lack of fuel after the redeployment (emphasized by me. - M.S.). The regiment, consisting of 21 MiG-3s, is based at the Zubov airfield. Total produced 9 air takeoffs...

23 IAP 24.6 covered the airfield from enemy attacks. A total of 22 sorties were made. The regiment, consisting of 16 MiG-3s and 4 I-153s, is based at the Zubov airfield 164 IAP from 5.00 to 20.00 covered the actions of [bombers] SB from 86 BAPs and covered the airfield from enemy attacks. A total of 37 sorties were made. The regiment consisting of 13 I-16, 15 I-153, 1 I-15 is based at the Zubov airfield. 66th IAP 24.6 flew from the Komarno airfield (35 km southwest of Lvov) to the Zubov

airfield. At 19.00 he moved to the Popovets airfield (40 km south of Zubov). Due to the lack of fuel, he did not perform combat work. Total aircraft 17 I-15bis, ZIL-2.

Chief of Staff of the 15th AD, Colonel Skotarenko. (278) After that, everyone (both the commander of the 6th Army and the Air Force Headquarters of the 6th Army) tried to return the 15th SAD "in place". Early in the morning (at 03.25) on June 25, Lieutenant Colonel Glyzin, Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the 6th Army, sent the following telegram to the Commander of the Front Air Force:

"I inform: due to the lack of direct communication between the units and the headquarters of the Air Force of the 6th Army, the actions of the units of the 6th Army are not ensured. The commander of the 15th SAD, the commander of the 6th Army, ordered on 24.6 to relocate to the airfields previously occupied by it. Due to the lack of communication, it is not known whether this was done or not. The headquarters of the Air Force of the 6th Army is located in Bzhukhovitsy (probably Bryukhovychi, 10 km north of Lvov), I am the Air Force commander for the headquarters, who knows where. I ask for your order to relocate the 15th SAD to its airfields at the

Lvov air hub." There were really big problems with communications in the Red Army; "everyone knows" and the reason that gave rise to them: "saboteurs cut the wires." This reason is important, but not the only one. There were others. In the archives of the headquarters of the Air Force of the 6th Army, a piece of paper has been preserved, on which it is written by hand, in pencil:

"To the Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the 6th

Army, Shevchenko. Why don't you have my documents, which I so diligently send you, for which the U-2 29.6 plane made 4 flights to Tarnopol (it's difficult to cut wires in aviation. - M.S.) and one 30.6, and you demand documents from me. The crew brought me receipts for the delivery of documents. I have 7 receipts in total. Chief of Staff of the 15th AD, Colonel Skotarenko. And in the

archives of the headquarters of the Red Army Air Force there is a multi-page report "Communications in the Red Army Air Force during the Patriotic War from 22.6.41 to 1.10.43", signed on November 2, 1943 by the head of the Communications Directorate of the headquarters of the Air Force of the KA, Lieutenant General Gvozdkov. It also indicates the total number of radio stations (of course, excluding airborne ones) that the Air Force headquarters were equipped with by the beginning of the war (25 RAT, 351 RAF / 11AK, 384 RSB / 5 AK), and a brief assessment of their use is given:

"The leading officers did not know (???) all the possibilities of radio communication and often, in the absence of [wired] telephone and telegraph communication between units, believed that there was no communication between them at all, despite the fact that the radio facilities at that time were in full readiness (emphasized me. - M.S.) and could ensure the transmission of the necessary orders and orders ... "[308]

Let us return, however, to the fighting of the Southwestern Front. On June 25, 1941, the 15th SAD (with a few exceptions) remained at its new base, and this day became the day of the most intense combat work of the division (167 sorties were made). On this day, in accordance with the order of the commander of the South-Western Front, General of the Army Kirponos (No. 0015 of 21.00 24.6), a counterattack by the mechanized corps of the front was to begin. True, a day later the following order was issued (No. 0016), and the time for the start of the counteroffensive was postponed to 9.00 on June 26, but the front aviation had already begun to fulfill the very decisive order No. 003 of its commander: concentrated strike and actions of small groups of

3–6 aircraft and single-handedly against the accumulation of enemy troops in the area of Krystynopol (now Chervonograd), Radekhov, Shurovitsa, Grubeshov, Sokal (all points 40–60 km to the north-west

from Radekhov) and along the advancing enemy mechanized group from Brest in the direction of Kovel (this non-existent tank group of the Wehrmacht was present - moreover, with reference to "air reconnaissance of the 14th SAD" - in the operational documents of the command of the Yu-3 front until June 25. - M.

WITH.). The first concentrated strike from 6.50 to 7.00; strikes of small groups from 7.00 to 8.00. Re-raid from 12.00 to 14.00. From 6.45 to 18.00, cover the concentration and actions of ground units in the areas of

extermination. Tension: bomber aircraft - two sorties, fighter aircraft - three sorties.[309] So "beautifully", as —

prescribed in the order, the aviators of the 15th SAD did not succeed. Moreover, despite the fact that more than half of all the sorties of that record day were spent "on covering the airfield", only one (maybe two) pair of German "Heinkels" was able to disable on the ground And the planes of the 164th and 66th th aviation regiments: "Operative report No. 04 of the

headquarters of the 15th SAD from 21.00 25.6.41, air. Zubov 23 IAP from 6.30 to 9.30 covered the airfield, from 10.30 to 21.00 covered the actions of 22 DBAD in the Berestechko, So-kol, Radekhov area. Aircraft sorties were made: to cover the airfield 18, to cover the bombers - 17, to bomb the troops - 9.

Losses: in the air? 1 MiG-3 was shot down in combat, 1 MiG-3 made an emergency landing outside the airfield. Losses in personnel - one pilot was killed and one wounded.

The regiment consisting of 10 MiG-3s and 4 I-153s is based at the Zubov

airfield. 28 IAP. Aircraft sorties flown: for cover airfields and DBAD - 24, for bombing enemy troops - 24.

Losses: 4 planes were forced to land on their territory, 1 the pilot was wounded and landed at the airfield.

After completing the task, 11 aircraft landed on the Chunev airfield (the first report on the partial redeployment of fighters from the 15th SAD to the Lvov air hub. - M.S.) and 6 on the Zubov airfield. 164 IAP from 9.30 to 21.00 covered

the airfield from the attack of the Air Force enemy. A total of 33 sorties were made for cover.

At 7.20, as a result of a raid on the airfield by two He-111s, 5 I-16 and 1 I-153, an engineer of the regiment was killed,

3 people were wounded. Regiment consisting of 7 I-16s and (inaudible, possibly

"15") I-153s at the airfield Zubov 66 ShAP. He made 24 sorties for cover from an enemy air force attack, 3 s / a for escorting one SB, 6 s / a for reconnaissance and 9 for the destruction of

enemy tanks. As a result of a raid on the Popovets airfield by two Non-111s, 1 S-B from 16 SADs was destroyed and

5 I-15bis of 66 ShAPs were damaged. After completing the task, 9 aircraft landed in Komarno (the second and last message about the return relocation to the Lvov air hub; however, from the air. Komarno to the Radekhov area was a little closer than from the air. Popovtse. - M.S.), 8 I-15 and 2 IL-2 at

the Popovets airfield.

Division Headquarters - Zubov. On June 26, the division continued intensive combat work to support ground units in the Radekhov-Brody area, and even high-speed high-altitude MiG-3 fighters were used to bomb the enemy mechanized columns (23 sorties were completed, 28 FAB-100 and 6 FAB-50 were dropped). In addition, the 23rd and 28th IAP fired 47 s / v to patrol and escort their bombers, and during 19 air battles

2 Bf-109 and even "one autogyro" (???). 4 "flashes" did not return to their airfield. The fighters of the 164th IAP carried out 50 sorties that day (an average of two per serviceable aircraft), attacked enemy motorized mechanized columns in the Radekhiv-Krystynopol area, and covered the bombers. The losses were very high: 6 I-16s did not return to their airfield, one I-153, hit in the air by anti-aircraft fire, burned down after landing at the airfield. As will be shown below, the escorted bombers of the 16th SAD did not return to their airfield either (although there were only four of these bombers)[310] . In Opersvodka No. 05 dated 20.00 on June 26 (from —

which the above information was taken) there is no mention of the actions of a group of 11 "Migs" of the 28th IAP, who flew in the evening of June 25 to the airfield of the former base in Chunev. One can only assume that they were in the area of the Lvov air hub for several more days,

because in the "Journal of registration of downed enemy aircraft" two "Messers" were noted, shot down on June 29 in the area of the Kurovice airfield. The fact that a group of fighters of the 15th SAD is based at the Kurovice airfield is also mentioned in Opersvodka No. 1.

As for the group of I-15bis attack aircraft, they are also mentioned in Opersvodka No. 05 of the headquarters of the 15th SAD in a similar way: "Information about the combat work of 66 ShAP was not received due to lack of communication with Komarno." By the end of the day on June 26, "parts of the division consisting of 19 MiG-3, 1 Il-2, 4 I-16, 15 I-153 are concentrated at the Zubov airfield. 18 I-15s from 66 ShAPs at the Popovets airfield, with Zubov as a stad. (280)

In short and simply put, the reverse relocation of the 15th SAD to the Lvov air hub never took place. It is worth noting here that already on the morning of June 26, the Germans relocated two of the three groups of the JG-3 fighter squadron from airfields in the Zamostye region to captured Soviet airfields in the Lutsk region. (130) Thus, the Luftwaffe fighters were 50 km away, and the fighters

15th GARDEN - at a distance of 120 km from the battlefield of the tank battle near Dubno.

On June 27, according to Opersvodka No. 01 of the Air Force Headquarters of the 6th Army, units of the 15th SAD "continuous patrols in the air" covered the actions of the 15th mechanized corps in the Brody-Radekhov area. 126 sorties were made, 5600 kg of bombs were dropped. The neighboring 16th SAD did not lag behind, which also "covered units of the 15th MK with continuous patrols in the air." On the other hand, according to the report of the acting commander of the 15th MK, Colonel Ermolaev ("A brief description of the hostilities of the 15th MK in the period from June 22 to July 12, 1941"), the corps "did not see support for our aviation during all the battles." Almost the same thing is written in the report "On the combat activities of the 10th Panzer Division on the front of the fight against German fascism for the period from 22.6 to 1.8. 1941" Acting commander of the 10th TD of the 15th Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Sukhoruchkin: "There was no support for the division from our aviation during the entire period of hostilities. Even intelligence data from aviation has never been received by the division ... "

As for Colonel Ermolaev, he took command of the 15th mechanized corps after, on the evening of June 26, "18 enemy aircraft heavily bombed the command post of the 15th mechanized corps at an altitude of 210.0 south of Topor in (20 km south of Radekhiv). The bombing continued for 50 minutes, as a result, 2 Red Army soldiers were wounded and 1 was killed. (293) As a result of this bombing, surprising in duration (and meager result), the corps commander, Major General Carpezo, was seriously shell-shocked (and even buried alive in the ground by his subordinates). After that, the corps temporarily lost its combat effectiveness and went on the offensive against Berestechko only at noon on June 28.

By this time, all combat-ready air units had already switched to fighting the 11th Wehrmacht Panzer Division, which, having escaped from the encirclement that was brewing in the Dubno region, was rapidly advancing towards Ostrog-Shepetovka. Opersvodka No. 02 of the Air Force Headquarters of the 6th Army dated 19.00 on June 28 reports that the 15th and 16th SAD "contributed to the elimination of the tank group [of the enemy] in the Ostrog region, covered the actions of bombers in the Ostrog, Zdolbunov, Mizoch regions." On June 28, the 15th SAD carried out 88 air combat, conducted 30 air battles, dropped 30 FAB-50s on enemy troops, and shot down 7 enemy aircraft in air battles. (282)

In the meantime, the operational situation in the Lvov region has deteriorated significantly. Under the threat of encirclement, the troops of the 6th Army began to roll back east

to Tarnopol. About what consequences it had for. 15th SAD, say the mean lines of Opersvodka No. 03 of the 6th Army Air Force Headquarters dated 19.00 on June 29: "Faulty aircraft burned out from the bombardment at the Kurovice airfield (the number has not been established). Aircraft at the Sknilov airfield were burned by our departing units ... "(283) It was probably there and then that dozens of damaged (or simply left when relocated to the Zubov airfield) "Migs" were destroyed, which in the first two days of the war so inexplicably "fell" from list of materiel of the 23rd and 28th IAP.

On the morning of June 30, German troops occupied Lvov. It can be assumed that on the same day, some Luftwaffe air units were relocated to the airfields of the Lvov air hub. Base area of the 15th SAD (Zubov, Trembovlya, Popovtse airfields)

turned out to be within the reach of German fighters, which they immediately took advantage

of: "Operesvodka No. 11 headquarters of the 15th SAD, Zubov airfield,

by 16.00 on 30.6.41. From 15.12 to 15.20, the Zubov airfield was attacked by 11 Me-110 bombers. 1 MiG-3 and 3 I-153 flew out to repel the attack, in addition, 8 MiG-3 and 12 I-153 returned from the mission got involved in the air battle. The group of bombers was dispersed, dropped their bombs in the corner of the airfield and left in different directions. 1 Me-110 was shot down (judging by the Enemy Aircraft Downed Record Log, the 28th IAP shot down 4 Bf-109s and 1 "bomber of an unidentified type" that day). Losses: 1

I-153 was shot down in an air battle over the airfield, 4 I-153s were damaged on the ground, 1 I-16 was burned on the ground. Flying

units: - 50 s / a (47 hours 27 min.)

MiG-3, - 26 s / a (32 hours 50

min.) I-153, - 11 s / a (14

hours) I-16u - 17 s / a (24 hours 12

minutes) I-15bis. ... 164 IAP. As a result of an attack by enemy bombers at the Zubov airfield, 1 I-16 burned down, 4 I-153 and 1 I-16 were damaged (a few lines above this (?) Aircraft was named I-153, and it was shot down in the air, and not damaged on the ground - M.S.). In total, the regiment carried out 24 sorties, including 12 I-153s dropped 24 FAB-40s on a

column of tanks. 66 ShAP. There were no air battles and meetings, there were no losses. 4 crews did not return to their airfield (what prevented if there were no battles and "meetings"?). The regiment carried out 17 sorties. 10 I-15bis dropped 20 FAB-50s and 20 AO-10s onto a convoy of enemy vehicles. Bombs were dropped directly on the convoy ... "On the second day of that intense battle, June 30, the operational report (No. 12 of 23.00) notes that" from 16.00 to 23.00, a total of 14 shots were made on the MiG-3, 14 shots on I-16, 19 s / a on I-153. There were no air battles and meetings, there were no losses. At the end of the day on June 30, in the 15th SAD, the following were in combat readiness

30 июня	МиГ-3	И-16	И-153	И-15бис
23 ИАП	10	-	4	-
28 ИАП	7	3	-	-
164 ИАП	-	2	8	-
66 ШАП	-	-	-	8
сумма:	17	5	12	8

The note of the document says that "by July 4.001, 2 more MiG-3s will be repaired in the 28th IAP."

At dawn the next day, the enemy again tried to destroy the remnants of the air division at the Zubov airfield, but with even less success - General Demidov's subordinates had already gained some combat experience, and the attackers were met properly: "Combat report

No. d. 1.7 41 at 5.30 a.m. 9 Me 110 planes raided the Zubov airfield. When approaching the airfield, the planes broke into squads and acted independently. Our fighters, consisting of 12 I-153s, 5 I-16s and 10 MiG-3s, got involved in an air battle on the outskirts of the airfield, as a result of which the enemy dropped several bombs in disarray on the border of the airfield ... In an air battle, 2 Me-110s were shot down, which fell north west of Trembovl, two enemy pilots jumped out by parachute (judging by the "Journal of Downed Enemy Aircraft," the 28th IAP shot down 2 Bf-109s that day in the Trembovl area, Chubovets). Air combat in the area of the airfield was

carried out for 5-7 minutes. Our losses: 2 I-16s of the 28th IAP did not return to their airfield after the air battle. When taking off on alert, 2 MiG-3s were damaged (collision), one of them can be restored, and the second cannot be repaired in the field. At one I-153 23 IAP, during takeoff from a bomb explosion, the percale (fabric of linen sheathing. - M.S.) of the plane was pierced ... "

On the same day, July 1, 1941, the commander of the 15th SAD wrote a report to the front air force commander; in the document there is a clear desire to "draw a line", but, having already learned from bitter experience, Major General Demidov refuses to relocate units without a direct written order:

"Commander of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General Astakhov 1.7

41, 17.50" 1. There is no communication with the headquarters of the 6th Army. I support U-2 planes with Tarnopol, we lost two U-2 planes (did not return) and communication was still not established. 2.

Communication center 15 AD is located in Trembovlya, there is a Morse telegraph apparatus - this is 9 km from the airfield. There is a telephone and a Morse apparatus from Trembovl through this communication center directly to the airfield, but this connection is constantly interrupted between the airfield and Tarnopol (as in the text. - M.S.). In addition, no one can be summoned from Tarnopol, the headquarters of the Air Force of the 6th Army, apparently, left Trembovl (yes, it is difficult to establish contact with the headquarters if the

headquarters does not want this connection. - M.S.). 3. In the absence of communication with the Air Force of the 6th Army, the ground situation is unclear, where our units are and what they are doing is unknown. In such a situation, it may turn out that no one will inform about the relocation of regiments to a new airfield. I will not relocate from the Zubov airfield without your order. To communicate with the front headquarters in Proskurov,

I am sending a third U-2 aircraft. 4. It is dangerous to act against the troops, because they do not identify themselves. Anti-aircraft

artillery fires at its aircraft ... 8. My parts have been working without interruption for 10 days, it is necessary to change motors, replace spare parts, propellers, etc. The situation with the materiel is as follows: 2.7 will have nothing to work on.

After that, the following postscript is entered: "The local bodies of the Soviet government were evacuated from the city of Trembovl, the NKVD and the police were also evacuated. The postal workers run away. There are no military units in —

Trembovlia ."[311] There is a handwritten resolution on the document: "2.7. 2.00. 15 AD rebase 2.7. to the air hub Tiranovka, Varvarovka (i.e., to the area of the city of Proskurov, where by that time the headquarters of the South-Western Front had already been relocated. - M.S.). Aircraft to be repaired should be sent to Kyiv to aircraft workshops. Signature (illegible, similar to "Astakhov").

At this, the participation of the 15th SAD in the battle in Western Ukraine was almost completed. Judging by the "Journal of downed enemy aircraft" 28,-0 IAP, the next one - after two "Messers" shot down

July 1 - the record appears only on July 17 (however, in the "Summary of destroyed enemy aircraft" attached to Astakhov's report, it is stated that from July 1 to July 3, fighters of the 23rd and 28th IAP shot down 4 enemy aircraft each) [312] . It's time to bring — results.

Compared with other formations of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, the 15th SAD was undoubtedly one of the best - its pilots acted both more intensively and more productively than others. Judging by the "Summary" mentioned above, from June 22 to July 3, the fighters of the 15th SAD shot down 73 enemy aircraft - more than half of the total number of declared victories of the Front Air Force fighters (133 units, but here we must not forget that the "Reference" does not reflect combat work of the 64th IAD). Comparison with real, i.e., reflected in enemy documents, losses of Luftwaffe aircraft shows that the "Summary" from the report of General Astakhov gives a quite modest, approximately twofold, overestimation of victories in the air (172 versus 72 for the period from June 22 to June 30) - True, these figures do not take into account the actions of the anti-aircraft artillery of the Southwestern Front, which also shot down German aircraft and wrote the corresponding

reports. In any case, it can be assumed without much exaggeration that the fighters of the 15th SAD shot down about 30-35 enemy aircraft in just 10 days of fighting. This is not so small, taking into account the gigantic size of the Soviet Air Force. If each of the approximately 20 Soviet fighter (mixed) air divisions actually shot down 3 German aircraft per day (and even the bomber gunners would add half an aircraft per day), then in a month there would be practically no one to fight with ... Very eloquent and temporary dynamics: if in the nine days of June of the 41st fighters of the 28th IAP announced 24 enemy aircraft shot down, then in four months (July, August, September, October) there were only 21 of those. Probably the most significant is the comparison of the number of victories and their own

losses. The 23rd IAP lost in the air ("shot down in air battles", "did not return from a combat mission") 9 aircraft and 6 pilots, the 28th IAP - 11 aircraft and 8 pilots. These data are taken from the report "On the state of the units of the 15th AD", signed by Major General

Demidov on July 8, 1941. Data on

The declared victories refer to a slightly shorter period of time (from 22.6 to 3.7), but this does not introduce a large error, since the activity of the division's actions in early July decreased sharply. For the 23rd IAP according to the "Summary" there are 29 enemy aircraft shot down, for the 28th IAP - 25 (according to the "Register" - 26). Thus, even taking into account the likely 2-fold overestimation of the number of victories, these air regiments shot down more than they lost. Strictly speaking, this is the only way it should be for a fighter regiment (a fighter is a hunter, not a game), but for June 41, such a result can be considered outstanding.

Quite high - by the standards of the Soviet Air Force - can be considered the intensity of the combat work of the 15th SAD. As can be seen from the table below, on some days the number of sorties reached 2-3 per serviceable aircraft:

	23 ИАП	28 ИАП	Всего в 15 САД	с/в, 15 САД
4.00 22.6	50/20	52/14	102/134	
20.00 22.6	14/5	9/5	23/55	?
20.00 24.6	16/4	21/?	37/49	68
21.00 25.6	"10/4	17/?	27/43	167
20.00 26.6	?	9	19/37	120
? 27.6	?	?	37/52	126
? 28.6	10+1/?	12+3/1+2	22+4/32+2	88
утро 30.6	11+1/3+2	9+10/3+7	20+11 / 37+?	-
23.00 30.6	10/4	7/3	17/25	151
? 01.7	8+4/4+1	11+5/5+3	19+9/31+8	?

Note - the first digit is "migi", the second is "old types" fighters (I-16, I-153, I-15bis); - the presence of "silts" of the 66th ShAP is not reflected in the table; - the second term is the number of faulty aircraft.

Such a rosy picture is noticeably spoiled by the reports of the commanders of the ground troops, who "did not see the support of our aviation during all the battles." But this paradox has its own rational explanation. First of all, one should not forget that these commanders had to somehow explain the defeat of the troops entrusted to them, the loss of people and almost all combat materiel. Secondly, the noisy pre-war propaganda formed among the Soviet people (including the commanders of the Red Army) absolutely unrealistic expectations: the future war seemed to them something like a huge May Day parade on rough terrain; within the framework of such representations, the sky was supposed to be covered with clouds of red stars aircraft.

Thirdly, it is necessary to look at how numerous sorties were spent in the 15th SAD. An analysis of the available information shows that 390 sorties (about half of their total number) according to the tasks to be solved were distributed as follows: - 142 s / a to cover their own airfields; - 125 s / a for attacking enemy mechanized columns; - 117 s / a for escorting and covering bombers; - 6 s / a for reconnaissance.

What of this could the ground troops notice? The question, as they say, is rhetorical ... The most difficult, by no

means rhetorical, is the first important question: where did half of the combat aircraft of the 15th SAD disappear to? The report "On the state of units of the 15th AD" of July 8, 1941, repeatedly mentioned above, allows us to get closer to the answer to it. The information presented in the report on the losses of aircraft in two regiments of the division is summarized in the following table:

	23ИАП	28ИАП
Наличие на 4.00 22.6	50/20	52/14
Сбиты в воздушном бою, сбиты ЗА, не вернулись с задания	11/3	13/1
Аварии и катастрофы	3/1	3/0
Уничтожены противником на аэродроме	5/5	0/0
«Уничтожены за невозможностью восстановить»	4/0	27/8
«Повреждены противником на земле и сожжены за невозможностью перебазировать»	23/10	0/0
Наличие на 8.7	5/2	8/6

Note - the first digit is "migi", the second is "old types" fighters (I-16, I-153); - during the reporting period, 2 (1 / 1) aircraft were received by the 23rd IAP, 28th IAP - one I-16; - in the 28th IAP "the presence after the flight" of one MiG-3 was not established.

As you can see, the main component of the losses was the "self-immolation" of aircraft damaged in the first (first) days of the war and destroyed after a hasty relocation from the airfields of the Lvov air hub. However, in this respect, Demidov's division turned out to be much better than others - in the report (Ex. No. 018) to the commander of the Air Force. front dated July 1 we read: "Motors for replacement from Sknilov - Lvov were evacuated by us to Proskurov along with aircraft workshops." Yes, of course, that's exactly how it should be; relocation should take place together with the materiel, and not in

fleeing from her, but in the reports of June 41 other phrases are more common.
And even more often there are no reports themselves ...

3.5. 16th GARDEN. Longest

The 16th SAD, the second of the air divisions attached to the 6th Army, was in the depths of the operational formation of the troops of the first echelon of the Southwestern Front. Enemy ground troops reached the pre-war base area of the 16th SAD only 7–9 days after the start of hostilities; thus, the need for a hasty panic "relocation" for this air division did not arise, and it continued active, organized combat operations longer than other formations of the first echelon of the air force of the front. Nevertheless, in the short history of the 16th SAD, the three stages that we could see earlier in the history of the 15th air division are clearly traced: a sudden and inexplicable reduction in the number of combat aircraft on the first day (days) of the war, a very intensive use of the few remaining aircraft in the following days, the final relocation of the remnants of the division to the deep rear 10-15 days after the start of hostilities. On the eve of the war, the 16th SAD included three air regiments: two fighter (87th and 92nd IAP) and one bomber (86th BAP).

Fighter regiments were full, 5-squadron, fully (and even with some "brute force") equipped with combat aircraft: 62 I-16 and 3 MiG-3 in the 87th IAP, 64 I-153 and 4 I-16 in the 92nd IAP. This is the data from the document of the division headquarters (report "On the presence and losses of aircraft equipment of the 16th SAD from 22.6 to 8.7.41"). Figures close to these are also given in the report of the Front Air Force Commander: 60 I-16s and 4 MiG-3s in the 87th IAP, 63 I-153s and 5 I-16s in the 92nd IAP. There were even more pilots in the regiments than aircraft: 76 and 72, respectively (and we are talking about pilots "prepared for combat operations").

The division's bomber regiment was much worse equipped. How much "worse" - it's hard to say for sure. Strange as it may sound, but in the studied documents of the 16th SAD and the headquarters of the Air Force of the 6th Army, I could not find information about the presence of aircraft in the 86th BAP on the eve of the war. As of June 1, 1941, the regiment had 51 SBs and 10 Pe-2s in good (!) Condition, however, there were crews

much less - only 34. On the other hand, judging by Astakhov's report, the 86th BAP had 35 SBs and 9 Pe-2s (a total of 44 bombers) and 62 combat-ready crews. At dawn on June 22,

1941, only a few units of German aircraft appeared over the airfields of the 16th SAD, located at a depth of 100-150 km from the border. The result was as follows:

“Operational report of the headquarters of the Air Force of the 6th Army, Lvov, 20.00 22.6.41 1. The Air Force of the 6th Army fought against enemy aircraft and airborne assault forces during 22.6, preventing their penetration into our territory, covered the exit of units of the 6th th army to

the state border and conducted reconnaissance. 2. Parts of 16 SAD were put on alert: 92 IAP, Brody airfield, at 4.35; 87 IAP, Buchach airfield, at 4.25, 86

BAP, Zubov airfield, at 5.10. 3. At 0500 hours, one flight of [enemy] fighters appeared over the Brody airfield at H-5 meters, which made two attacks on the aircraft stationed at the airfield. As a result, two I-153 aircraft, one U-2 and a field photo laboratory were burned; 2 people were killed, 6 people

were injured. At 0505, one squadron was scrambled into the air. In air combat, 2 He-111 aircraft were shot down. One of our aircraft did not return to its airfield, and one plane was forced to land in the Radekhiv region. The

plane is broken, the pilot is unharmed. At 12.00 (as in the text, the report is from 20.00, but it fixes the state of the air regiments of the 16th SAD at 12.00. - M.S.) the regiment was based on airfields: two squadrons - Brody, one - Lutsk, one - Pankivtsy, in readiness for actions in the composition of

33 crews (underlined by me. - M.S.). 4. At 5.50, one [aircraft] - a reconnaissance aircraft dropped incendiary bombs and fired at the aircraft of the 87th IAP at the Zubov airfield (as in the text; most likely, we are talking about the Buchach airfield. - M.S.). 4 people were killed, 21 people were injured. The regiment made 22 patrol sorties and air combat. In combat, one enemy aircraft was shot down, type not established. One crew did not return from a combat mission.

The regiment at 12.00 was in Tarnopol with two squadrons, three - Buchach in readiness for combat operations, consisting of 19 crews (emphasized by me. - M.S.). dropped bombs. The second

attack by two Ju-88s was at 6.30. All finished aircraft were lifted into the air. During takeoff, one aircraft caught fire in the air (probably it was one of the Pe-2 regiment; aircraft of this type had an unfortunate tendency to spontaneous combustion in the air due to sparking wiring in the electrical remote control system. - M.S.) and fell 4 km to the south airfield. As a result of two attacks on the ground, 4 aircraft were burned yes ... (text break. - M.S.) ". (300) So, the first enemy raid on the airfields of the 16th SAD was not sudden (the Germans appeared over the base airfield of the 92nd IAP 25 minutes after the regiment was put on alert, over the airfields of

the 87th and 86th BAL - an hour later), nor massive. As a result, the ground losses of the fighter regiments are absolutely miserable: two aircraft in the 92nd IAP and not a single one (as far as one can judge from the contents of the Opersvodka) in the 87th IAP. During sorties, two aircraft were lost in the 92nd IAP and one in the 87th IAP. The enemy also lost three planes. To begin with, and in the fight against the enemy, who has accumulated a lot of practical combat experience,

quite good.

It remains only to understand the arithmetic in which $68 - 4 = 33$, and $65 - 1 = 19$. However, an attentive reader, of course, noticed that the document does not talk about aircraft, but about "crews", i.e. about the pilots. In other words, it can be assumed that by 12.00, i.e., 7.5 hours after the announcement of the combat alert, less than half of the available flight personnel arrived at the airfield. Such a bad assumption is quite compatible (in the part concerning the

87th IAP) with the Special Communication of the 3rd Directorate (military counterintelligence) of the NCO No. th Army: "The commander of the 87th IAP of the 16th air division, Major S. and his deputy for political affairs, battalion commissar Ch., on the night of June 22, together with other commanders, were drinking in a city restaurant

Buchach. After receiving a telegram from the headquarters of the 16th air division about a combat alert, the regimental command, being in a drunken state, was unable to quickly put the regiment in order. On June 22, at 5.50, a German bomber appeared over the airfield, which was mistaken for the aircraft of the division commander. In view of this, he freely began shelling the airfield from a height of 10–15 meters and disabled 9 planes..."

The story of the raid on the Buchach airfield is described in many modern publications. Particularly emphasized is the treachery of the opposing enemy, who, instead of blowing a siren and launching flares, approached the object of attack at an extremely low altitude. It is important for us to note that those 9 (or, according to other sources, 7) aircraft that were put out of action at the same time were not even part of the armament of the 87th IAP, but stood at the airfield waiting to be transferred to another unit. That is why in the above Opersvodka there are no indications of the loss of equipment of the 87th IAP on the ground.

This regiment did not suffer any losses on the ground and the next day, June 23, 1941. Judging by Operational report No. 02 of the headquarters of the 16th SAD dated 20.00 on June 23, "units of the 16th SAD from 4.00 to 20.00 acted to destroy enemy tanks and artillery on land and the destruction of enemy aircraft in the air, covered Tarnopol and Brody. The 87th IAP patrolled the city and the Tarnopol railway station. In total, the regiment completed 70 s / v, conducted two air battles, during which one enemy bomber (type not specified) would be destroyed. One I-16 was destroyed in the accident, the pilot was seriously injured. After that, without any explanation, the Opersvodka said: "87 IAP at the Tarnopol airfield, consisting of 28 aircraft in readiness No. 2." How is it - 28? Where are the rest, that is, about 35 more combat aircraft?

On June 23, the 92nd IAP acted more actively and more effectively. In the region of Brody - Lutsk, the regiment made 80 sorties. Two Bf-109s were shot down in aerial combat, and our own losses were zero (and this was in a battle on "gulls" against "Messers" of the latest modification F). During an enemy air raid on the Pankivtsi airfield, 7 I-153 aircraft were slightly damaged, which "will be restored by the morning of June 24." Taking into account the fact that 4 aircraft of the 92nd IAP lost on June 22, how many of the 68 available to

start of the war? There is very little left, judging by Opersvodka No. 02. 21 combat ready aircraft.

Amazing arithmetic finds some (although far from complete and unreliable) explanation in the report "On the losses of materiel of the 16th AD for the period from June 22 to 24 inclusive", signed by the division chief of staff, Colonel Poluyanchenko. Let's present this information in the form of a table:

	87ИАП	92ИАП
сбито в воздушном бою	3+1	2+0
уничтожено на земле	9+0	12+1
повреждено	16+4	20+0
сумма:	28+5	34+1

Note: the first figure is the losses for June 22, 1941.

It turns out that everything was not at all as indicated in the first two operational reports! Not even close! It turns out that on June 22, the fighter regiments of the 16th SAD lost 57 combat aircraft on the ground. Or was there an "emergency drop" in the division of really faulty, but previously not taken into account as such, aircraft? Or did the compilers of the report simply try to "adjust" fictitious losses to the real presence of aircraft? If so, then they adjusted it very carelessly. Judging by the Operational report No. 07 of the headquarters of the 16th SAD dated 5.30 June 25, "by 4.00 25.6, 30 I-16s in the 87th regiment, 22 I-153 and 3 I-16s in the 92nd regiment are in readiness No. 2. Normal arithmetic shows that the 92nd IAP lacks 8 aircraft.

The fate of the allegedly damaged aircraft is also unclear, and there were as many as 40 of them in three days. The damaged ones must either be repaired and become combat-ready (which, in the case of the 16th SAD, judging by the overall balance of the loss and the remainder of the materiel, did not happen by the end of the day on June 24), or remain on the list of faulty ones. However, judging by the report "On the combat strength of the units of the 16th SAD as of 24.6.41", the 87th IAP has only 4 faulty I-16s (and 30 combat-ready, which coincides with Opersvodka No. 07), and in the composition On the 92nd IAP, a single faulty "seagull" was found (as well as 23 serviceable I-153s and 4 serviceable I-16s, which almost coincides with the data of Opersvodka No. 07). (304) Where did 35 more defective combat aircraft "fly away"?

Just as inexplicable are the statistics of the presence and losses of fighter pilots of the 16th SAD. The aforementioned report "On the combat composition of the 16th SAD units as of 24.6.41" states that 54 combat-ready crews (i.e. 54 pilots) remained in the 87th IAP, 58 in the 92nd IAP. by the time the hostilities began - 76 and 72 combat-ready pilots, respectively. Lost more than 20 pilots in each regiment. How can this be combined with information about 6 downed (or not returning from air combat) aircraft? And what is most surprising, on the same day, the head of the combat department of the headquarters of the 16th SAD, Senior Lieutenant Noriusky, signs the summary "On the losses of personnel in parts of the 16th AD for June 22-24." It follows from it that 4 pilots died in the 87th IAP, 2 pilots died in the 92nd IAP. (305) I give the reader the right to build any that suits him

hypotheses about this...

Having got rid of half of the aircraft on June 22-24, the fighter regiments of the 16th SAD, in an almost unchanged (!) Composition, continued active combat operations until the end of June. On June 25, the 92nd IAP

made 71 s / a (on average, three sorties per serviceable aircraft - for the Soviet Air Force, the figure is completely record-breaking, however, there were twice as many pilots in the regiment as serviceable aircraft) with a total flying time of 80 hours. 30 min. Two He-111 bombers were shot down. The 87th IAP completed 64 s / a with a total flying time of 70 hours. 30 min. In a dogfight, a German bomber, identified as a Ju-88, was shot down. Its further fate is described in Opersvodka No. 08 of the headquarters of the 16th SAD as follows: "The bomber landed at the Plotyche airfield, the crew fled." (306) Strange. Plo-tyche is 22 km west of Tarnopol. At that time, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and all relevant command structures, including the leadership of the "special departments", were located in Tarnopol. How, then, could the crew of an enemy aircraft land and escape from an airfield located 22 km from the front headquarters? Or was the airfield already in the hands of Bandera? On June 26, on the first day of the counteroffensive of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, the 16th SAD was actively operating against enemy ground forces. For a bombing attack on German mechanized

columns, "seagulls" of the 92nd IAP were used, each of which, with a suspension

four small-caliber bombs, turned into a light short-range bomber. "Combat report No. 08 headquarters of the 16

AD, Trembovlya, 16.00 on 26.6.41. 92 IAP in the period from 10.20 to 12.30 acted on enemy tanks in the Berestechko area. The actions of the 92nd IAP were covered by the fighters of the 87th IAP. 80 sorties were made, of which 53 s / a - 92 IAP and 27 s / a - 87 IAP. Dropped 106FAB-50 and 106yy-20... Two Bf-109s were shot down in a dogfight. Our losses: 2 I-153 did not return from the battle. German fighters attack at high altitude, break away quickly and leave the battlefield. 87 IAP with 13.00 patrols covered the airfield and the city of Tarnopol. Completed 21 s / a. The evening operational report (No. 10 dated 17.00 26.6.41) of the division

headquarters confirms the above number of sorties, calls twice the number of enemy aircraft losses ("4 Bf-109s were shot

down in air combat") and for some reason 2.5 times reduces the weight of bombs dropped on the enemy ("3 tons of bombs were dropped" - while the calculator suggests that 106 FAB-50 and 106 A0-20 weigh 7420 kg in total). (308) In any case, the use of a few "under-bomber" fighters - with a meager bomb load and a complete lack of bombsights - cannot be called anything other than an act of desperation. And what did a full-fledged bomber regiment of the division do at the same time?

remaining

V

line up

V

quality

The strange story of the fighting of the 6th BAP began at dawn on the second day of the war. The first group of bombers was led into battle by the regiment commander himself, the second by his deputy. Information about the result is conveyed to us by a telegraph tape crumbling from dilapidation. Combat report No. 1 of the headquarters of the 16th SAD was signed by Colonel Poluyanchenko at 9.15 on June 23:

"1. 86 BAP during the period (inaudible) made two sorties. The first group - 9 aircraft, the leader - the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sorokin, the second group - 6 (illegible, possibly five) aircraft, the leader - the deputy commander of the regiment, Captain Bely. Assigned: destruction of enemy tanks that broke through the border in the Sokal-Krystynopol area.

2. Departure of the first group at 5.10, departure of the second group at 5.40. Providing bombers with escort to the target and back was assigned to 92 IAP. 3.

The first group, when approaching Brody at H-1000 meters, was attacked by 15 Bf-109 aircraft at about 0600 hours. In the ensuing air battle, the bombers shot down 6 and lost 5 aircraft. The remaining 4 continued to carry out their combat mission and dropped bombs on the Ostrov railway station (border station near the city of Krystynopol. - M.S.). No tanks were found in the Krystynopol area (in the early morning of June 23, the tanks of the 11th Wehrmacht division were already approaching Radekhov. - M.S.).

For some unknown reason, the 92nd IAP did not rise to escort (strange, but signed at 20.00 on the same day on June 23, the operational report of the division headquarters No. 02 states that "92nd IAP covered the

actions of 86 BAP." - M.S.). 4. No reports were received regarding the combat operations of the second group under the command of Captain Bely

(it is being checked). 5. Since dawn, the Popovce airfield has been repeatedly attacked by small groups of enemy aircraft. On the ground, there is no loss of materiel. 4 technicians killed.

6. At the Popovets airfield, 3 SB, 2 Pe-2, 1 CSS are in service (a training version of the SB bomber. - M.S.). 5 SB aircraft require repair. It is expected to have 6-9 aircraft in one to an hour and a half ...

"Now let's calculate a little. You won't even need a calculator here: - 9 and 6 (maximum) aircraft took off on a combat mission; - 5 (not counting the training CSS) in service at the airfield; - 5 are under repair; - 5 (4 on the ground and 1 in the air) lost on June 22. Where are at least 14 serviceable, combat-ready aircraft? At 11.30, Combat Report No. 2 was drawn up. It summed up the results of the first (the only and last) "massive" bombing strike of the 86th air regiment: "1. From the group of Captain Bely at 6.20 a group of five SB aircraft completed a combat mission to destroy tanks in the Krystynopol area. The group reached the goal without air opposition

the enemy and dropped 30 high-explosive bombs from a height of 2000 meters on a cluster of tanks and artillery 4

km west of Krystynopol. The

group reached the landing airfield safely, but was unexpectedly attacked by I-16 planes (probably they were fighters of the 87th IAP from the nearby Buchach airfield. - M.S.), as a result of which one aircraft was shot down, made an emergency landing near the airfield, capoted. The crew was wounded, the plane was completely destroyed.

One SB aircraft from the group of Lieutenant Colonel Sorokin returned to the airfield area and made an emergency landing near the village of Yegelnitsa due to lack of fuel. From this

report it is impossible to understand what happened to the other planes of the Sorokin group that survived after the meeting with the Messers over Brody: "one" of the entire group returned or "one" of the returned villages to an emergency, not reaching the airfield? According to Operational Report No. 02 of the Iggaba

of the 16th SAD, by the end of the day on June 23, the bomber regiment of the division carried out 6 more sorties "to destroy tanks and convoys", 2 sorties - to reconnoiter the enemy. Nothing is said about new losses (and those that have already taken place are not exactly named). True, there is a document signed by Colonel Poluyanchenko (without a number and title), from which it follows that by 6.00 on June 26, that is, three days after the events described above, 5 crews were listed as dead in the 86th BAP - exactly as many how many were shot down on the morning of June 23 over Brody. Information about the military operations of the 86th BAP for June 24 could not be

found (only in the documents of the 15th SAD there is a mention that the fighters of the division, by that time relocated Zubov, bombers of the 96th BAP covered the airfield). By 4 o'clock in the morning on June 25, at the airfields of Popovets and Ilovche, 7 SB and 4 Pe-2 were in (Operational report No. 07 of the headquarters of the 16th SAD). In three days, the regiment turned into an incomplete squadron. True, at that time there were 46 crews in this "squadron" - four for each serviceable aircraft, and in the presence of a reliable fighter cover (for which the bomber regiment and

united organizationally within one division with two fighter regiments) such a "squadron" could be capable of to much...

The day of June 25 began extremely successfully for the 86th BAP:

"Operational report No. 08 headquarters 16 SAD, Trembovlya, 18.0025.6.41

... 2. 86 BAP from 6.00 to 8.00 five aircraft (out of 11 combat-ready. - M.S.) bombed a column of enemy tanks on the road Krystynopol - Verbniv. Dropped 30 FAB-100 bombs. The target is blocked by bombs. In the target area, the aircraft were fired upon by ZA fire, there were no hits. The Bf-109 fighters covering the column did not engage in battle ... "It happens, as we see, in a war

and this: both anti-aircraft guns missed enemy fighters paid no attention.

Alas, the luck was short-lived: "During landing, the bombers were attacked by fighters of the 15th SAD, as a result, two SB aircraft had gas tanks shot through. One plane was shot down, forced to land, the pilot was wounded, the gunner-radio operator was killed ... By 20.00 25.6.41 in readiness No. 2 in 86 BAP 4 serviceable

S B, 45 crews ... "About the existence of 4 Pe-2s, which on the morning of June 25 were considered serviceable and in the battle - as far as one can judge from Opersvodka No. 08 - did not participate, there is not a word. However, at 5 am on June 26, one combat-ready Pe-2 appears in Operational Report No. 09. (311) And then this lone "pawn", led by the regiment

commander, also appears in the air: "Operational Report No. 10

Headquarters 16 SAD, Trembovlya, 17.00 26.6.41 "... 86 BAP made 4 sorties under the cover of MiG-3 and I-16 fighters of the 15th air division on a column of enemy tanks on the Berestechko-Verba road (30 km southwest of Dubno. - M.S.). All four aircraft, including 3 S-B and 1 Pe-2, did not return from the mission.

According to the testimonies of the crews of the MiG-3 planes covering the Pe-2, in the Radekhiv region, a group

[consisting of] 1 Pe-2 and 2 MiG-3 was met by two enemy Bf-109 fighters. During the battle, another Bf-109 link approached two Bf-109s. As a result of the battle, one MiG-3 was shot down. The Pe-2 aircraft was lost from view during the battle, and there is no information about it (the crew commander is the commander of the 86th BAP, Lieutenant Colonel Sorokin).

A link of SB aircraft, which flew out at 9.00 to perform a combat mission, acted on a tank column [of the enemy] and, when escorted by I-16 aircraft from 15 SAD, did not return to its airfield ... "

After the loss of the commander of the 86th BAP, it finally "got out of action." Operations report No. 11 of the headquarters of the 16th SAD dated 18.00 on June 27 briefly states: "The 86th BAP did not conduct combat operations." In the future, direct references to sorties (or losses) of the 86th BAP were not found in the documents, however, in Opsvodka No. 18 FAB-100. Theoretically, a fighter could also raise a "hundredth", but it still seems more plausible to me that the mentioned 18 FAB-100s are six "hundredths" (a typical load of SB bombers) in the bomb bays of each of the three aircraft that took part in the battle 86th BAP. And these aircraft, we note, every day became more and more! By the evening of July 2, the regiment, practically inactive due to lack of fuel at the Tiranovka airfield (12 km north of Proskurov), already had 6 SBs and 6 Pe-2s (Opsvodka No. 017 of the headquarters of the 16th SAD).

Meanwhile, the fighter regiments of the 16th SAD still continued fight:

"Operational report No. 11 headquarters of the 16th SAD, Tarnopol, 18.00 27.6.41 1. Parts of the 16th SAD during the day 27.6 conducted active operations to destroy enemy tanks and motorized parts in the area of Shurovice, Berestechko, Verba (southwest of Dubno, i.e. in the zone of the last offensive of the remnants of the 8th and 15th mechanized corps. - M.S.). Continuous patrols in the air (we already spoke about the realism of these statements above. - M.S.) covered units of the 15th mechanized corps in the area of Brody, Radekhov, Krasne. Conducted combat reconnaissance of enemy tank columns and covered the airfield and the city of Tarnopol from enemy air raids.

In total, the division fired 156 s / s, dropped 6000 kg of bombs of various calibers on enemy tanks.

2. 87 IAP performed 64 s / v to cover units of the 15 MK in the Brody-Radekhov area. "Nine" I-16 met in the area of Brody 3 Ju-88' one shot down. Fighter I-16 has holes, temporarily out of

building. 3 I-16s, after an air battle, used up fuel and made an emergency landing outside the airfield, one of them derailed and is to be repaired.

3. 92 IAP carried out 58 airborne operations, [including] 45 sorties to cover the 15th mechanized corps and to bomb. Direct hits on [enemy] tanks have been noted. Produced 13 s / a for reconnaissance. Losses: one plane was destroyed during an emergency landing ... "

The day before, 7 new Yak-1 fighters appeared in the 87th IAP, and the number of pilots in the regiment increased from 54 to 61. (308) It can be assumed that the "yaks" arrived in the 87th IAP along with pilots trained for their use. On June 28, the fighter

regiments of the 16th SAD carried out 57 s / c to cover the bombers, 79 s / c - to reconnaissance and attack ground targets, 59 bombs were dropped. The losses of that day were - according to Opersvodka No. 02 of the headquarters of the Air Force of the 6th Army - very high. 2 fighters were shot down, in addition, "6 I-16 and 9 I-153 did not return from the mission, including 5 I-16 and 2 I-153 due to lack of fuel, made an emergency landing." (282) True, these losses did not affect the number of aircraft in the units of the division indicated at the end of the Opersvodka: in the 87th IAP there are all the same 29 I-16s, 1 Mig-3, and 7 Yak-1 (according to the previous report "yaks" was even less - 5 units). As for the 92nd IAP, after they "did not return from task 9 I-153", the number of "seagulls" even ... increased! From 23 to 32 units. This phenomenon can be explained both by the general chaos, taking into account the combat vehicles in the 16th SAD, and by the transfer of the remnants of materiel (12 I-153) from the actually defeated 17th IAP of the 14th SAD (this was mentioned above, however, if you believe the "Historical Form" of the 17th IAP, then this transfer took place in July

41st). The day of June 29 was probably the most productive day of combat work of the 16th SAD. On this day, the division, as well as other units and formations of the Air Force of the front that retained their combat capability, non-stop attacked the mechanized columns of the 11th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, which broke through Ostrog to Shepetovka. The forces of the units of the 16th SAD made 89 sorties to attack motorized enemy troops, dropped a total of 9850 kg of bombs (18 FAB-100, 110 FAB-50, 102 AO-25). Except

In addition, 36 sorties were made to cover the troops, 26 - for reconnaissance. Two victories are claimed: 1

Bf-109 and 1 Hs-126 (tactical reconnaissance) shot down in aerial combat. Their own losses were relatively small (the Germans did not have enough fighters even to cover the main strike groups of ground forces) - 1 Yak-1 and 1 I-16 were hit by anti-aircraft fire, another I-16 was broken during an emergency

landing. The next operational summary of the headquarters of the 16th SAD, preserved in the archive File, is dated July 3rd. By that time, parts of the division were relocated to the airfields of Eastern

Ukraine: "Parts of the 16 AD were relocated by the end of 2.7.41: - 86 BAP consisting of 6 SB and 6 Pe-2 to the Tiranovka airfield; - 87 IAP consisting of 21 I-16s to the Khrolin airfield (there is no

longer a word about the "yaks" - M.S.); - 92 IAP consisting of 18 I-153 and 2 I-16 to the Sudilkov airfield. There are no fuel and refueling facilities at the Tiranovka and Khrolin airfields; the forward echelons of the bases have not fully arrived, the main echelons are on the way. We organize

the delivery of fuel from Sudilki and Polotoe. From the morning of July 3, the air hub 16 AD was subjected to continuous raids by enemy aircraft in groups of 3-9 Bf-109 and He-111. As a result of the raids, one I-16 was burned in the 87th IAP, and one I-153 was damaged in the 92nd IAP (a

very modest result of "continuous raids." - M.S.)." Two days later, the division was already beyond the Dnieper, at a distance of more than 450 km to the east of its pre-war deployment. On July 5, 1941, the deputy chief of staff of the 16th SAD, Major Chernyshev (new signature under the documents of the 16th SAD)

reports to the chief of staff of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front: "I inform that the headquarters of 16 AD, 86, 87, 92 air regiments, 270, 271 and 276 air bases by 15.00 were mainly relocated to the Vertievka airfield *. Further, Major Chernyshev reports in what condition the division was relocated

Not a word was said about the presence of any aircraft in the 86th BAP. In the 87th IAP, in two days of redeployment, the number of "donkeys" decreased from 21 to 11, of which 9 are considered faulty. In the 92nd IAP, the situation is slightly better - out of 18 "gulls" 12 remained (of which 6

out of order), 2 I-16 remained in stock, but also recognized as out of order. In the end, of the approximately 175 combat aircraft that the 16th SAD had on the eve of the war, only 25 remained available, of which 8 were combat-ready. There is no explanation for the loss of one and a half hundred combat aircraft in the report. We will try to

understand this issue on the basis of available documents. To establish the circumstances of the loss of the bombers of the 86th BAP, apparently, is no longer possible in principle. The compiler of the report "On the presence and losses of equipment of aircraft of the 16th SAD from 22.6 to 8.7", which was repeatedly mentioned above, does not even try to solve this problem, but gives the following figures for two fighter regiments of the division:

	87 ИАП	92 ИАП
Состояло на утро 22.6 (самолеты всех типов)	65	68
Сбиты в воздушном бою	4	4
Не вернулись с боевого задания	6	21
Уничтожены противником на аэродромах	12	15
Уничтожены при отходе	15	16

*Now - Vertievka Nezhinsky district of Chernihiv region of Ukraine.

If you believe these figures (and do not take into account the arrival of 7 new "yaks"), then 28 aircraft should have remained in the 87th IAP, and 12 aircraft in the 92nd IAP. The result obtained roughly coincides with the data of the report of Major Chernyshev, but only for the 92nd IAP (in the 87th IAP, 17 aircraft are "not enough" to the arithmetic balance). It is also easy to see that for the 92nd IAP, the "balance" converged only due to the appearance in the table of a huge number of missing persons ("did not return from a combat mission") aircraft.

Quite different figures are obtained if we carefully sum up all the losses of aircraft of the fighter regiments of the 16th SAD, specifically indicated in the above operational reports and combat reports. The result for the period from 04:00 on June 22 to 07:00 on June 29 (excluding the arrival and loss of yaks) is shown in the following table:

	87 ИАП	92 ИАП
Состояло на утро 22.6 (самолеты всех типов)	65	68
Сбиты в воздушном бою	7	3
Не вернулись с боевого задания	2	10
Уничтожены противником на аэродромах	9	13
Повреждены противником на аэродромах	16	20
Повреждены в бою, вынужденные посадки	10	3
Разбиты в авариях и катастрофах	1	1
Арифметический остаток	20	18
Состояло исправных на 19.00 29 июня	30	30

The fact that in reality there were a third more serviceable aircraft than the arithmetic difference between the initial number and losses should not surprise us. Firstly, half of the losses are damaged (on the ground, in an air battle or during a forced landing after a battle) aircraft, they could be repaired and put into operation. Secondly, and most importantly, the number of aircraft "destroyed and damaged by the enemy at airfields" is taken from the clearly overestimated (from 2 to 57 units) report "On the loss of materiel of 16 AD for the period from June 22 to 24 inclusive." Be that as it may, on the evening of June 29, the division still had 60 serviceable fighters (including the "yaks" - and all 65). A landslide reduction in the number (up to 25, of which 8 are serviceable) occurred already during the two-fold redeployment (from Tarnopol to Proskurov and from Proskurov to Nezhin). The fact that a large

(main) part of the aircraft was lost not in combat is indirectly confirmed by the statistics of the presence and losses of pilots given in the report of Major Chernyshev dated July 5, 1941. Let's present these figures in the form of the following table:

	86 БАЛ	87 ИАП	92 ИАП
Состояло к 20.00 21.6	67	84	74
Убито	5	7	4
Ранено	7	16	4
Пропало без вести	3	16	11
В наличии на аэр. Веркиевка, в пути следования	14	31	33
Направлены на переучивание, курсы, в другие части	38	14	22

Note: for the 86th BAP, the first three lines indicate the number of pilots, and the last two lines indicate the number of crews. In this table, everything converges exactly, to one person. True, this "accuracy" was achieved only due to the large number of "missing

without a trace". In any case, during the 20 days of the war in the 16th SAD, the irretrievable losses of aircraft were 3.5 times (!) Exceeded the number of killed and wounded pilots.

3.6. Results and discussion

A detailed examination of the combat operations of all units and formations of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front at the stage of the "border battle" would require a multi-volume study. Considering that the volume of this chapter is not unlimited, we will now try to sum up some preliminary results. In accordance with the general rules of didactics, we will move from the simplest to the most complex. The simplest

conclusion should be recognized as the one that can be drawn on the basis of a single glance at a geographical map with the locations of Soviet airfields plotted on it. There is no "concentration of the main aviation forces at the border posts" at all. By the time the hostilities began, four dozen (it is impossible to give an exact figure due to the presence of a large number of "forming" air units that were in varying degrees of staffing and combat readiness) air regiments of the Kiev OVO Air Force were fairly evenly distributed over the vast expanse of Right-Bank Ukraine. With the exception of the 149th IAP at the Chernivtsi airfield, even the fighter regiments of the first echelon of the district (front) Air Force were based at a distance of at least 50–70 km from the border. Accordingly, the tales about how "on the morning of June 22, the airfields were fired upon by German artillery, and closer to noon, enemy tanks rolled out onto the airfield..." which have received wide circulation in recent years, have nothing to do with reality. Enemy aviation (the 5th air corps of the 4th Luftwaffe Air Fleet) was concentrated

on a much smaller (8 main) number of airfields, and even bomber groups were based no further than 100 km from the border. All this created very favorable conditions for delivering a massive strike against enemy airfields, but all the pre-war plans, in which this strike was described in detail, were "forgotten" from the very first minute of the war. Unlike the Air Force of the Odessa District (Southern Front), which at least took some - very weak and

unorganized - attempts to strike at airfields on enemy territory, aviation of the Southwestern Front, with rare exceptions, did not cross the border line, and the enemy could feel completely safe at his airfields. The task set by the pre-war plans of delivering a bombing strike on transport infrastructure facilities (bridges, crossings, railway stations and stages) in the operational rear of the enemy was completely ignored. The combat work was distributed extremely unevenly among the formations of the air forces of the front. And not

even according to the old unkind saying: "Whoever is lucky, they will load it", but rather according to the opposite principle: "Whoever is loaded, he was lucky." In other words, the volume of combat work was actually determined not by the Soviet command, but by the enemy; The air forces of the front only reacted - more or less successfully - to the strikes inflicted by enemy aircraft. "In general, for the regiment, the second day of the war passed quietly, the Germans did not touch the airfield" - this ingenuous phrase from the memoirs of F. Archipenko quite accurately conveys the essence of the "reactive method" of controlling the combat operations of the Front Air Force.

A clear illustration of this can be the repeatedly mentioned above "Summary of destroyed enemy aircraft", attached to the report of the commander of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front dated August 21, 1941. The information contained in it can be summarized in the following, very eloquent, table:

	22-30.06	1-6.07 -	7-12. 07
14 САД	29	10	1
15 САД	65	8	0
16 САД	20	2	2
17ИАД	0	0	41
ВВС 12-й армии	0	0	74
36 ИАД ПВО, г. Киев	0	0	17

Of course, this "Summary" is not very accurate. In particular, the "Air Force of the 12th Army", to which (again, one can only guess) the compiler attributed the air regiments of the 63rd, 64th and 44th divisions, shot down a number of enemy aircraft already in the first days of the war; there were downed enemy planes and for the 36th IAD. However, the overall picture emerges quite clearly. In the first week of the war, the fighter units located in the depths of the operational formation and on the southern flank of the front were actually inactive

they patiently wait for the moment when the enemy, having defeated the first echelon of the air force of the front, will reach them. Such "operational art", shown by the command of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front, looks especially contrasting against the background of the actions of the enemy, who continuously redeployed his air units, following the advancing ground forces (already on June 26–27, fighter groups of the 5th Luftwaffe air corps flew over to the captured Soviet airfields in the breakthrough zone of the 1st Panzer Group, and in early July the entire air corps moved from Poland to former Soviet

territory). Another, very uncommon manifestation of the "reactivity" of the actions of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front can be considered a surprisingly large number of enemy aircraft shot down, declared by bomber gunners. Of course, "declared" and actually shot down are not the same thing at all, but the same logic can and should be extended to the declared victories of fighter pilots. So, judging by the aforementioned "Summary", in the period from June 22 to July 3 inclusive, fighter regiments announced 133 downed enemy aircraft, and bomber gunners - about 70 (62nd BAD - 33,

18th dietary supplement - 17, 16th dietary supplement - 12, 19th dietary supplement - 8). The 62nd BAD ended up in an honorable third place in terms of the number of enemy aircraft shot down (declared), thus ahead

of many fighter divisions! This is absolutely "abnormal", nowhere else found in the statistics of victories and losses in the air. The statistics are all the more strange if we remember that the Air Force of the Southwestern Front had twice as many fighters as bombers, and fighters flew more often, and they were based much closer to the front line. Perhaps we are simply misled by the very conditional reliability of the "Summary"; perhaps the bomber gunners, for reasons unknown to us, were especially prone to "postscripts." However, the hypothesis seems more likely to me that a German pilot could find himself in a situation of air combat mainly in the case when he himself actively "asked for" this battle[313]. The last of the list of relatively simple conclusions is that—

not a single figure in numerous reports, operational summaries and

combat reports of June 1941 cannot be trusted without a thorough check, comparison with other reports, summaries and reports. The chaos in the documents of the Air Force of the front is simply frightening; warplanes disappear no one knows where, and then suddenly "resurrect" in tens and hundreds. The generally accepted figure given in many studies of the total number of sorties by the Air Force of the Southwestern Front is 10,000 in the period from June 22 to July 10. The report of Astakhov, Commander of the Air Force of the Front, gives the number of airborne flights in the period from June 22 to August 10 - 36,780 sorties. In other words, in the first days of the war, when the number of Air Force aircraft of the front was measured in four-digit numbers, an average of 530 sorties per day were carried out. And from July 10 to August 10, after about two hundred serviceable aircraft remained in the aviation of the front,

the average number of sorties increased to 890 per day? Even the already quite simple question of the location of air units on a certain date is by no means always possible to find out reliably and accurately. It remains to be assumed that the method of "relocation" of headquarters described in the memoirs of A. Bilenko was a fairly common phenomenon. Accordingly, the reports compiled in these headquarters (and which today have received the almost sacred status of "Archival Document") reflect mainly the extent of the imagination of the staff clerk, but by no means the reality.

A rather paradoxical and largely unexpected conclusion has to be drawn on the basis of an analysis of the effectiveness of the actions of the fighter regiments of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front: it is practically impossible to catch the connection between the results of air battles and the performance characteristics of the used fighter aircraft. Both successfully and extremely unsuccessfully, regiments armed with the latest "yaks" and obsolete (without any quotes) "seagulls" acted in equal measure. Moreover, the strange irony of history was manifested in the fact that it was the obsolete I-153 biplanes that were armed with such relatively actively and effectively fought units as the 46th IAP (14th SAD), the 92nd IAP (16th SAD), 12th IAP (64th IAD).

How and how can this be explained? Low reliability of available documents? The general rule that "The best fighter is the fighter with the best pilot in the cockpit"? Of course, these arguments deserve attention, but,

perhaps one more should be added to them: "All zeros are equal to each other." The effectiveness of the actions of the fighter aviation of the Southwestern Front was generally low, and this was due not to the performance characteristics of the aircraft, but to the extremely low level of management (that is, they flew little, not where and not where they should, without communication and control, without interaction with ground troops and VNOS system). In the same very rare cases, when a squadron of Soviet fighters stumbled in the air on a lone pair of heavy and clumsy Heinkels, the sad outcome of the battle for the Germans had little dependence on who exactly they met - with "Migs" or "Donkeys" . This outcome was largely facilitated by the fact, confirmed by documents "from both sides", that the German bombers operated in small groups or even single aircraft, without fighter cover, to a great depth (up to 200-300 or more kilometers from the front line). On the other hand, the extremely small number of German fighters

also failed to inflict serious losses on the enemy (i.e., aviation of the Southwestern Front). In all formations of the Air Force of the front, the combat operations of which were discussed above, losses in air battles make up only a small fraction of the total number of losses, and this despite the fact that the fighters of the JG-3 squadron acted with great effort and with very high efficiency. Here it is already necessary to move from words to numbers. Highly interesting figures are found in the certificate "On the losses of equipment of the Air Force of the South-Western Front from 22 to 30.6.41." The document was signed on July 2 by Major General Laskin, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Front.

According to this certificate, in air battles (not counting 28 combat aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire) only 138 aircraft were shot down (38 SB, 31 I-153, 26 MiG-3, 24 I-16, 10 DB-Zf, 7 Pe -2, 2 Yak-1), which is less than 8% of the original number (if we take into account the bombers of the 4th DBAK, then the percentage will become even lower).

On the other hand, in 9 days of hostilities, German fighters actually shot down (they declared 258 downed Soviet aircraft) more enemy aircraft than their own (fighters) number (138 versus 109). This is a very high, record figure. For comparison, let me remind you that probably the most effective fighter division of the Air Force of the South

Western Front, 15th SAD, in the same 9 days declared (not shot down in reality, but declared!) 65 enemy aircraft. As for its own strength, even after the inexplicable loss of half of the combat aircraft in the 15th SAD, there were about 50-70 combat-ready fighters daily. On the whole, the real (confirmed by German documents) losses of the 5th Air Corps [315] This figure (in the June 1941 was 73 aircraft, which - let's not [314]. Luftwaffe in forget about it - also included aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft guns and fire from bomber gunners) in many times less than the most minimal estimates of the number of front air force fighters. If German

fighters shot down no more than 8% of the initial number of aircraft of the Air Force of the South-Western Front, and anti-aircraft guns (and not always German) added another 2% to that, then where, in this case, did the huge grouping of Soviet aviation go[316] ? The reader, I hope, still remembers that at the beginning of this chapter, data were given from two documents, judging by which the Air Force of the front from June 22 to July 11 lost either 4/5 or 9/10 of the initial number of combat aircraft. And the few remaining ones ended up at the airfields in the region of Chernigov, Nezhin and even Kursk by that time

(the 19th BAD was "relocated" there, in which 23 out of 143 bombers remained, including 13 - faulty), i.e. were actually withdrawn from the combat zone and were listed as part of the Air Force of

the active front purely formally. The surviving documents make it impossible for us to attribute this shameful defeat to the consequences of a "sudden strike on peacefully sleeping airfields." In the above-mentioned certificate "On the losses of equipment of the Air Force of the South-Western Front from 22 to 30.6.41" the consequences of a strike on airfields are carefully recalculated - by day, type o

	22.6	23.6	24-25.6	26-30.6	Всего:
МиГ-3	33/25	2/3	6/6	0	41/34
Як-1	0	0	1/13	0	1/13
И-16	23/22	1/0	5/17	1/0	30/39
И-153	70/20	10/6	0/13	0	80/39
СБ	7/0	0	3/25	1/1	11/26
Пе-2	2/7	0/6	0/2	0	2/15
Всего:	135/74	13/15	15/76	2/1	165/166

Note: the first digit is destroyed, the second is damaged.

So, in total, 165 aircraft were irretrievably destroyed at the airfields (not counting the obsolete I-15bis, which we did not include in the general list of front air force combat aircraft). If by "sudden strike" we mean the events of the first day of the war, then on that day the Air Force of the Southwestern Front irretrievably lost only 135 aircraft on the ground - again, less than 8% of the original number. Taking into account damaged and temporarily disabled aircraft, the figures for ground losses on the first day of the war increase to 209 aircraft (12% of the original number). That's the whole "destructive blow". In the following days, the losses, as one would expect, became much smaller. Moreover, by that time, many damaged aircraft, of course, had passed into the category of serviceable ones. Such a statement is based on facts - judging by the report of the front air force commander of August 21, during the three weeks of the war (from June 22 to July 13) 990 aircraft were restored. Is it possible - taking into account all the above about the reliability of staff documents in June 1941 - to believe these figures? Of course, there is no need to talk about the completeness and thorough accuracy of accounting for ground losses. Nevertheless, the data given in the certificate "On the losses of equipment of the Air Force of the South-Western Front

from 22 to 30.6.41" are fully confirmed by many other documents and facts. Firstly, very close figures are also mentioned in Astakhov's report: 237 aircraft destroyed and damaged on airfields during the first three days of the war, 304 aircraft destroyed and damaged on airfields from June 22 to June 30 inclusive. Secondly, the airfields of 6 out of 11 air divisions of the Air Force of the front were not subjected to any enemy influence at all on the first day of the war (not

counting the appearance of a single reconnaissance aircraft in the sky, dropping a couple of bombs from a high altitude that fell a kilometer from the airfield). In those divisions of the first echelon, the airfields of which became the object of attack, serious losses were suffered (this was discussed in detail above) only the following

shelves:

- 247 IAP (64 IAD), 42 aircraft were damaged and destroyed [317]; - 149 IAP (64 IAD), from 15 to 36 aircraft destroyed; - 12 IAP (64 IAD), 32 aircraft destroyed, 4 damaged; - 62 ShAP (63 SAD), from 23 to 45 aircraft destroyed; - 66 ShAP (15 SAD), 34 aircraft destroyed and damaged. In total - 5 regiments out of about 40 in the Air Force of the Front. Moreover, only two of these five (12th and 149th IAP) were a real combat unit. The remaining three are the emerging 247th IAP (it is not even clear whether there were pilots in this regiment who could fly) and two "caps" armed with obsolete I-15 / I-153 biplanes. In addition, from 5 to 15 aircraft were damaged and destroyed on the ground in the 23rd, 28th,

164th fighter regiments of the 15th SAD, 17th, 46th and 89th fighter regiments of the 14th SAD. Real (without later "cheating") ground losses were just that. That is why the figures presented in the certificate of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Front dated July 2 - 209 aircraft (not counting the I-15), destroyed and damaged on the ground on June 22 - seem to me quite reliable, and if underestimated, then only by a few dozen units. Strictly speaking, this can already be the last point. Yes, "the topic is not disclosed." The task set at the beginning of this chapter (to reconstruct the events of the "strange

war", during which 4/5 of the combat aircraft were lost and 3/4 of the flight crews were saved), has not been solved. It hardly has a solution at all, since we will never be able to establish with accuracy what, what real events are hidden behind such vague categories as "burned at the airport due to the inability to recover", "damaged during a forced landing due to running out of fuel", "the location after the flight was not established", etc. And if there is a solution, then you need to look for it somewhere in completely different places and documents. For example, in the protocols of the communist party meetings of the 46th fighter

air regiment.

This regiment is one of the best, in the future - the 68th Guards (do not think, dear reader, that I was specifically looking for and finally found some particularly sloppy unit). The protocols of party meetings are a thick "ledger", hundreds of pages scribbled

calligraphic handwriting.[318] Now ~~it~~ has already been declassified - however, I did not find anything related to the "military secret" in the truest sense of the word in these protocols. Comrade communists discuss their politmorsos (political and moral state) in great detail, with all the details and details. They not only discuss, but also, in a Party way, directly condemn the existing shortcomings.

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PARTY BUREAU of the 46th IAP dated

January 5, 1940 Listened to: Comrade Taranenko's personal file (I have changed all the names, any coincidences with real people are accidental. -

M.S.) that Comrade Taranenko

got lost, and the party bureau demands that he show where his acquaintance lives. Taranenko did not tell us the whole truth about his acquaintances "

Comrade Gavrilov: "Taranenko did not think that he was standing on the edge of the abyss - the communist received an invitation card in an envelope to a banquet where strangers were!"

comrade Grishin: "The party brought up comrade Taranenko and gave him a lot, but comrade Taranenko forgot that he was given a lot, and now he is beginning to lose the dignity of a communist. Taranenko forgets that by inviting him to a banquet, he could be involved in counter-revolutionary intelligence due to his oversight. Taranenko, relying on Soviet laws> covers up his non-partisan actions. comrade Evdokimov: "When they said

that Taranenko was at odds with his wife, I did not believe it. Taranenko found a place where to get divorced - in Western Ukraine, where every trump card is for enemies! And one more thing - Taranenko did not act like a communist, deceiving his wife. comrade Sherstnev: "Why

did comrade Taranenko rush home before Narodnye Zborov? But because you had a secretary in your constituency! You accompanied her to Lviv, so you do not give your wife money for 3 months; it's not communist. You hide behind the laws, and lived with her for 8-9 years! You should have told the party bureau that you fell in love with her."

comrade Dronov: "We are talking, but Taranenko does not even think about anything! He thinks, they say, "you say, but tell me what you want!" Taranenko has now finally broken away from the party.

Comrade Tikhonov: "Based on the laws, Taranenko blindly understands them. For us Communists, there is one law—the Rules of the Party. Taranenko, as a communist, has lost his class vigilance, so we must sharpen the entire party organization on this.

Decided: - for

domestic decay, expressed in connection with a woman, having a wife, and serving as a reason pushing Comrade Taranenko to divorce; - for the blunting of class

vigilance, expressed in
attending a banquet on New Year's Eve;

- for insincerity, expressed in the fact that, having a connection with
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notes

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Contrary to popular misconception, the numbers in the designation of the grade of aviation gasoline do not equal its octane number. Gasoline B-74 had an octane number determined by the so-called "motor method" equal to 91, gasoline B-78 had an octane number of 93. It is also worth noting that the best Russian automobile gasoline AI-98 has an octane number "according to the motor method", equal to 89, i.e. inferior in this parameter to the aviation B-74.

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Another well-established myth is the assertion that the reason (or at least the pretext) for the arrest of Rychagov was this ill-fated “accident order”. Nothing like this. Three days later, on April 12, 1941, the order of the HKO USSR No. 0022 was issued, which, in particular, said: “According to the request of Lieutenant General of Aviation Comrade Rychagov, send him to study at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army.” Moreover, on May 4, the Politburo “removed the disgrace” from two other defendants in the “emergency resolution” of April 9: their merits in the Red Army, be limited to public censure” (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1039, l. 12). They were arrested much later: Rychagov - on June 24, and Proskurov - on June 27, already at the “peak” of the wave of arrests of the highest command staff of the Air Force that began at the end of May.

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104

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105

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106

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107

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108

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109

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110

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